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Part I - INFORMATIONAL HEARING 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING 
FOR CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS 
I. Opening Statement: Chairwoman Gwen Moore 
II. Witnesses 
Dean Kunihiro -- Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ~egion 5 
Nick Nikas -- Federal Emergency Management 
Administration (FEMA) 
~~ili!l-QQ~ratQ!~ 
Carney Ouye -- Sacramento Municipal Utility District 
Francis C. Jackley -- Manager, Nuclear Engineering and 
Licensing, Southern California Edison 
James G. Shiffer -- Vice-President, Nuclear Operations, 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company 
State and Local Government --------------------------
Anne Vasquez -- Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Planning, 
State Office of Emergency Services 
Sean Crowder -- Amador County 
. 
' 
lAW ON NUClEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING 
ra Atomic Energy Act, there is an established 
sibility between state and federal governments. 
recentl described their respective 
nder t e system of "dual regulation. 11 
federal government maintains complete control 
sa and 'nuclear' aspects of energy 
on; the states exercise their traditional 
over the need for additional generating 
, the type of generating facilities to be 
, land use, ratemaking, and the like . 
• Energy Commission, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1726 
nuclear reactor must obtain an operating 
federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One of 
ec nditions to obtaining a license under NRC 
e adoption and implementation of a satisfactory 
e an by the operator. What constitutes a 
a is essentially a matter of federal law. The 
lations (10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E) are 
C has decided that FEMA will make the initial 
adequacy for licensing purposes. (50 FR 19323, 
e ement in the emergency response plan 
articipation in planning and implementation 
ocal 9overnment. (See 10 CFR 
( 6) ' ( 14) ' ( 16)). 
ta t element is information management, 
e otification of local governments and the 
(See 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),(4),(5),(7)). 
ant element is identification of public health 
asures for protecting public health for persons 
he nuclear power plant site. (10 CFR 
),(12). A federal appeals court recently 
ement was not satisfied where a utility licensee 




Could Prove I 
By Bw.. PAUL 
a.n .Rqomrr o/T'IIm w AU. I~ J~A&. 
'ne erne~ evacuation plus for the 
nearly 100 commercial nuclear reactor~ in 
the 1J S. are outdated and could prove lnef· 
fecttve ln the event of an accident. ~ 
scientists and former government energy 
omctals contend. 
The nationwide debate over the evacua· 
tion plans, many of which were formulated 
after the 'l'hree MJit' Island accident In 
1979, Is certain to mcrease ln the ww of 
the Cbemobyl disaster tn the Soviet UDkiL 
"Tbe temperature bu been turned 
the argument 1s roinl to grow," 
sepb Hendrie, former cbalrman of the :N\1--
clear Regulatory Commission and MW a 
senter scientist at Brookhaven Na.t1o!W 
Laboratory in New York. 
Current V.S. evacuation plans call for 
people to be quickly evacuated m a 10-mik! 
radius around a damaged reactor. By 
dl1lls must be conducted every two yem. 
In tbese drills, utility and government offt· 
cials practice eJISUt'inf that. In 1m 
gency, sirens would sound, buses would 
ron. pollee would monitor b:lte~ 
Uoas. bospttals would be otber 
~ reqmrements would be met 
'WrOnr 'l'ldDg m Emerceaty• 
But "If you drill iD ~. It mlijf be the 
wrone thlng iD a real emereency." 
Nornum Rasmusson, a pbystctst 
Massacllu.st>tts Institute of Teclmoloo. 11-
deed, "It mtgbt be better just to ~ 
where you are," says Edwald Webster. a 
pbys!cia.n who also teaches radiation 
tection at Harvard Uruvemty. . 
Tbat's beca.Wie whlle evacuatkm 
Bini assumes tbat all nuclear accldftltll 
are the same. real emergencies eouJd 
wid'ely In terms of wb&t ll:md of 
reJta.sed. bow fast a.nd m wb&t ~ 
''Instead ot CODCeDtrating oo can we 
u.ata. we sbould be~ oo 
and; tf," evacuab sboWd 
R1clwd W'Usoo, a, pbyskist It ~fil""!!!M 
UllWersity. Be say~ evacuatioo plaillDI!!I'I 
.,. 't IIUfftdently t:ra.IMd to 
dllt.tnguJ.shtnJ ebaracte~ of u 
cBl and woo.ldD't !mow bow best to ,. 
IP$d Ill u emerp~Dcy. 
- these ~ say that Iince 
tloa. pideHDes were formulated by 
eral govel'lUl'leDt alter 'i"!aree K1le 
new scienttftc evidence bu shown 
danCer ol ra.dtatkla beyood tbree w 
mU .. rrom a plant 1s lea me 
tboqtlt. ld a result. the 
bavq I to-mile 
tists~y 
vm-•l!ll!l u evacuee might get a heavier 
111tttmr in !WI ear 111 an 
tbu if be ~ b:l hll -
the ~ cloled. 
The NRC currently Is studymj-wn6f--
tc reduce tbe evacuation r.ooe radius, but 
tbe Is proceeding slowly. VIctor Gt-
an NRC commissioner between 
1984, say~ that iD recent yean, 
""""··-·- been a general feelml (at the 
NRC) that safety matters aren't that 1m-
The NRC. he Mal, "bas reduced . 
nuclear industry don't like tbe author· 
had to ifve away to) state 
..n .. ,. ........ ..-t offtdall." 
Tbe pubncly bas aid tbat It is do-
an it can to msure that people would 1ae 
evwmted safely durtng 1m emergency. 
ot:ber scientists complaift 
ev~<:uation plans are further flawed 
neither tbe government 110r tbe 
has educated people 00 
a nuclear acctde'lt. 
"Yoo communicate that J!:md 
of mtormatloo untl1 there's a real emer-
" stmoo Goren, a professor of 
dlenrdei.J at tbe Univemty of 
NW'III'Iri'lv served 00 I bme-
that.stuttled tbe new 
Is reieued from a 
''T'IM NRC lll't 
the ~tala 
non-nucJ@u scientist lite my-
"The com.mlsskln needs to 
lnfctMmtUoo for the layman ud 
tt Into tbe publk'l bands. 'l"bat'l 
to avoid pete dw"'DD u 
I 
m~ It buder to evacuate tbcee ~ . 'Wd:kiD of the major W'W· 
dae plant wbo are In the greatest t - m me nuclear power industry." 
. ~· ii A.' 
I I I 
.47 
paragraph, unless the Commission 
rmines. among other things that 
proposed facility meets the re-
ements of paragraph (a)(l) of this 
,on. 
1<1 l Peak cladding temperature. 
calculated maximum fuel element 
ding temperature shall not exceed 
•"F. 
' Maximum cladding oxidation. 
calculated total oxidation of the 
ding shall nowhere exceed 0.17 
s the total cladding thickness 
re oxidation. As used In this sub-
graph total oxidation means the 
l thickness of cladding metal that 
ld be locally converted to oxide i1 
he oxygen absorbed by and react-
'ith the cladding locally were con-
ed to stoichiometric zirconium di-
e. If cladding rupture is calculated 
.ccur, the inside surfaces of the 
ding shall be included in the oxi-
m, beginning at the calculated 
of rupture. Cladding thickness 
re oxidation means the radial dis-
e from inside to outside the clad-
. after any calculated rupture or 
ling has occurred but before sig-
ant oxidation. Where the calculat-
mditlons of transient pressure and 
Jerature lead to a prediction of 
.ling with or without 
rupture, the unoxidized clad-
shall be defined as the 
.ling cross-sectional taken at 
rizontal plane at the of 
it or at the 
10 I 0-1~85 
<5> Long-term cooling. After any cal· 
culated successful initial operation of 
the ECCS, the calculated core temper-
ature shaH be maintained at an ac-
ceptably low value and decay heat 
shall be removed for the extended 
period of time required by the long-
lived radioactivity remaining in the 
core. 
<c> As used In this section: <1> Loss-
of-coolant accidents CLOCA's) are 
pathetical accidents that would 
from the loss of reactor coolant, at a 
rate in excess of the capability of the 
reactor coolant makeup system, from 
breaks in pipes in the reactor coolant 
pressure boundary up to and including 
a break equivalent in size to the 
double-ended rupture of the largest 
pipe in the reactor coolant system. 
<2> An evaluation model is the calcu-
lational framework for evaluating the 
behavior of the reactor system during 
a. postulated loss-of-coolant accident 
<LOCA>. It includes one or more com-
puter programs and all other informa-
tion necessary for application of the 
calculational framework to a specific 
LOCA, such as mathematical models 
used, assumptions included in the pro· 
grams, procedure for treating the pro· 
gram input and output information, 
specification of those portions o.f anal" 
ysis not included in computer pro-
values of parameters, and all 
other necessary to specify 
the calculational procedure. 
The reauirements section 
AOO 
NRC that there is reasonable assur-
ance that 
ures can and 
of a 
<2> The will finding on 
a review of the Federal 
<FEMA> 
and as to whether 
State and local emergency are 
adequate and whether there reason· 
able assurance that can be imple-
mented, and on the assessment 
as to whether the applicant's onslte 
plans are adequate and 
is reasonable assurance 
that they can be implemented. A 
FEMA finding will primarily be based 
on a review of the plans. Any other In-
formation already available to FEMA 
may be considered in assessing wheth-
er there is reasonable assurance that 
the plans can be implemented. In any 
NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA 
finding will constitute a rebuttable 
presumption on questions of adequacy 
and implementation EIDer-
preparedness exercises 
(b)<l4) of this section 
Section F of this 
the operational in-








Arrangements for requesting an• 
effectively using assistance resource. 
have been made, arrangements to ac 
commodate State and local staff at th• 
licensee's near-site Emergency Oper 
atlons I<'acility have been made, am 
other organizations capable of aug 
menting the planned :response hav1 
identified. 
A standard emergency classifica 
and action level scheme, the base: 
of which include facility system a.nc 
effluent parameters, is in use by tht 
nuclear facility licensee, and State anc 
local response plans call for relianct 
on Information provided by facility li 
censees for determinations of mini 
mum initial offsite response measures. 
ocedures have been established 
for notification. by the licensee, oJ 
State and local. response organization~ 
and for notification of emergency per· 
sonnel by all organizations; the con· 
tent of initial and followup messages 
to response organizations and tht 
public has been established; and 
means to provide early notification 
and clear instruction to the populace 
within the plume pathway 
Planning have been 
Provisions exist for com-
munications among response 
organizations to emergency personnel 
>the pubU< 




~ A range of protective actions 
have been developed for the plume ex-
posure pathway EPZ for emergency 
workers and the public. Guidelines for 
the choice of proteetive actions during 
an emergeney, consistent with Federal 
guidance, are developed and in place, 
and protective actions for the inges-
tion exposure pathway EPZ appropri-
atti_o the locale have been developed. 
(l.VI Means for controllmg radwlogt-
cal exposures. in an emergency, are es-
tablished for emergency workers. The 
means for controlling radiological ex-
posures shall include exposure guide-
lines consistent with EPA Emergency 
Worker and Lifesaving Activity Pro-
te~· e Action Guides. 
Arrangments are made for medi-
ca services for contaminated injured 
ind~duals. 
((La) General plans for recovery and 
re~ry are developed. 
1 Periodic exercises are <will bel 
con ucted to evaluate major portions 
of emergency response capabilities, 
periodic drills are <will bel conducted 
to develop and maintain key skills, and 
deficiencies identified as a result of ex-
er~s or drills are <will bel corrected. 
~ Radiological emergency re-
sponse training is provided to those 
who may be called on to assist in an 
e~ency. 
(!jil Responsibilities for plan devel-
opment and review and for distribu-
tion of emergency plans are estab-
lished, and planners are properly 
trained. 
<c>O) Failure to meet the applicable 
standards set forth in paragraph <bl of 
this section may result in the Commis-
sion declining to issue an operating li-
cense; however. the applicant will have 
an opportunity to demonstrate to the 
satisfaction of the Commission that 
deficiencies in the plans are not signif-
icant for the plant in question. that 
adequate interim compensating ac-
tions have been or will be taken 
promptly, or that there are other com-
pelling reasons to permit plant oper-
ation. 
<2) Generally, the plume exposure 
pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants 
shall consist of an area about 10 miles 
( 16 kmJ in radius and the ingestion 
pathway EPZ shall consist of an area 




§ 50.ig Fire onltl~·ctij:m. 
<aJ Each 
plant shall have 
that satisfies 
A to this 
plan shall 
430 
in this appf!ndix, an appli-
a newly will 
in a to the 
balance sheets and income 
sta.teJ:nents reflecting the results of prior op-
ap]pw~arlL should, however. !n-
avvu""""u a statement of its 
structure as of 
APPENDIX D-[RESERVED] 
APPEl!fDIX E-EMERGENCY PLANNING AND 
PREPAREDNESS FOR PRODUCTION AND 
ILIZA~riC>N FACILITIES 
Table of Contents 
L Introduction 
I. INTRODUCTION 
apJpm,a!Jtl: for a construction permit 
50.34<a> to include in the 
analysis report a dtscus-
~~~~r;~n~~;.u~~~~J~~p~l.~an~~snf~•Or coping with e for an operat-
§ 50.34tb> to in-
analysts report 
pot;eni•tal r!I.(Uologtcal hazards to the 
operation of re-
rf!!u~t.ors and fuel facilities ll-
50 and 70 ln-




10 CfR Ct.. I (1-1•85 Edition) 
power reactors and the degree to which 
compliance with the requirements of this 
section and sections II. III. IV. and V as nee-
will be determined on a case-by-case 
Notwithstanding the above paragraphs, in 
the case of an operating license authorizing 
only fuel loading and/or low power oper-
ations up to 5% of rated power, no NRC or 
FEMA review, findings, or determinations 
concerning the state of offsite emergency 
preparedness or the atlequacy of and the ca-
pability to implement State and local offsite 
emergency plans, as defined in this Appen-
dix, are required prior to the issuance of 
such a license. 
II. THE PltEt.IMl'NARY SAFETY ANALYSIS 
REPORT 
The Preliminary Safety Analysts Report 
shall contain sufficient information to 
ensure the compatibility of proposed emer-
gency plans for both onsite areas and the 
EPZs, with facility design features, site 
layout, and site location with respect to 
such consirlerations as access routes, sur-
rounding population distributions, land use. 
and local jurtsdictional . boundaries for the 
.EPZs in the case of nuclear power reactors 
as well as·the means by which the standards 
of§ 50.47Cbl will be met. 
As a· minimum, the following items shall 
be described: 
A. Onsite and offsite organizations for 
coping with emergencies -and the means for 
notification, in the event of an emergency, 
of pel'sons. assigned to the emergency orga-
nizations. 
"B. Contacts and arrangements mane and 
documented with local, State, and Federal 
governmental agencies with responsibility 
for coping with emergencies. including !den· 
tiflcatlon otthe principal agencies. 
C. Protective measures to be taken within 
the site boundary and within each EPZ to 
protect health .and safety in the event of an 
.socident; procedures by ·Which these meas· 
ures are to be carried out <e.g., tn the case of 
an evacuation, who authorizes the eva.cu· 
ation, how the ,public Is to be notified and 
Instructed. how the evacuation ts to be car· 
cooled 'nu.cl-ea:r 'r-ea:ctors and for reactors 
with an authorized power level less than 250 
MW thermal. GenerallY. the plume expo· 
sure pathwa-y EPZ for nuclear power plants 
with an authorized power level greater than 
250 MW thermal shall consist of an area 
about 10 miles (1:6 km) in radius and the in· 
gestton pathway EPZ shall consist cif an 
area about 50 miles <80 km> in rani us. 
•Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as 
guidance for the acceptability of research 
and test reactor emergency response plans. 
480 
Nuclear Regulatory ( 
to be n: 
treatment at offsite fac: 
injured as a result of lice 
F. Provisions for tr 
employees of the licens 
who are specifi 
sponsibility the even 
and for other persons w 
et>s of the licensee but w: 
be needed in the even 
emergency. 
G. A preliminary ana 
the time and means to l 
notification of State am: 
and the public in the ev 
ey. A nuclear pll 
perform a a. 
ff'QUired to evacuate 
tances within the 
EPZ for transient 
tions. noting major 
'"'"u"u1.uu or taking 
A 
need to include 
methods for 
ousness and vucerttu~l 
consequences of eme: 
within and outside the 
eluding fox 
using meteorol 
and for dispatch of radic 
teams within the EPZs; 








plans submitted m 
scrmt.:inn of the ea:m:ewc;s 
IV the 
'EPZs} to an 
strate that the 
surance that aa·~qlJai,e 
""'llUY'>"" report a dtscWI-
prE!llnlin;II.I'Y for coping with 
.,."'''""'"''- o.rmllcant for an operat-
by 50.34<b> to in-
le m the final safety report 
u; for coping with emergencies. 
hill appendix establishes minimum re-
~ements for emergency plans for use In 
Lining an a.cceptable state of emergency 
pa.redness. These plans shall be de-
bed generally in the preliminary safety 
lysis report and submitted as part of the 
J safety ana.lysll! report. 
he potential radiological hazards to the 
•lie associated with the operation of re-
rch and test reactors and fuel facilities U-
sed under 10 CFR Pa.rts 50 and 70 in-
;e consideratlollll different than those aa-
,ated with nuclear power reactors. Conse-
ntly, the size of Emergency Planning 
•es • <EPZs> for facilities other than 
li!PZs for power reactors are discussed in 
REG-0396; EPA 520/1-78-016, "Planning 
.is for the Development of State and 
al Government Radiological Emergency 
.ponse Plans in Support of Light Water 
;lear Power Plants," December 1978. The 
·, of the EPZs for a nuclear power plant 
II be determined in relation to local 
;rgency response needs and capabilities 
Lhey are affected by such condltlo1111 as 
.10graphy, topography, land characteris-
. a.ccess routes, and jurlsdictiona.l bound-
:s. The size of the EPZs also may be de-
nlned on a case-by-case basis for gas-
u wen u the means 
of II 50.4'Ub) will be 
As a minimum, the Items shall 
be described: 
A. Onslte and offsite orga.nlzations for 
coping with emergencies and the means for 
notification, in the event of an emergency, 
of persons a.s.signed to the emergency orga-
nizations. 
B. Cc:mta.cts and arrangements made and 
documented with local, State, and Federal 
governmental agencies with responsibility 
for coping with emergencies, including Iden-
tification of the principal agencies. 
C. Protective measures to be taken within 
the site boundary and within each EPZ to 
protect health and safety in the event of an 
accident; procedures by which these meas-
ures are to be carried out (e.g., in the case of 
an evacuation, who authorizes the evacu-
ation, how the public is to be notified and 
instructed, how the evacuation is to be car-
cooled nuclear reactors and for reactors 
with an authorized power level less than 250 
MW thermal. Generally, the plume expo-
sure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants 
with an authorized power level greater than 
250 MW thermal shall consist of an area 
about 10 miles < 16 kml In radiWI and the In-
gestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an 
area about 50 miles (80 km) In radius. 
• Regulatory Guide 2.6 will be used as 
guidance for the acceptablllty of research 




ousneas and j,.I(Jtentlal scope 
of emergency 
within outside the site boundary, in-
cluding capabilities for dose projection 
using real-time meteorological Information 
and for dispatch of ra.dlologlcal monitoring 
teams within the EPZs; and a preliminary 
analysis reflecting the role of the onslte 
technical support center and of the near-
site emergency operat1o1111 facility In assess-
ing information, recommending protective 
action, and disseminating information to 
the public. 
III. THE FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT 
The Final Safety Analysis Report shall 
contain the plans for coping with emergen· 
cies. The plans shall be an expression of the 
overall concept of operation; they shall de-
scribe the easentlal elements of advance 
planning that have been considered and the 
provisions that have been made to cope with 
emergency situations. The Plans shall Incor-
porate information about the emergency re-
sponse roles of supporting organizations and 
offsite agencies. That information shall be 
sufficient to provide assurance of coordina-
tion among the supporting groups and with 
the licensee. 
The plans submitted must Include a de-
scription of the elements set out ln Section 
IV for the Emergency Planning Zones 
<EPZsJ to an extent sufficient to demon-
strate that the plans provide reasonable as-
surance that adequate protective measures 
The organization for with rarllnlna_ 
leal e:mer""""ies shall described, 
of authorities, responsibilities, 
duties of Individuals a.s.signed to the li-
censee's emergency organization and the 
means for notification of such individuals In 
the event of an emergency. Specifically, the 
following shall be included: 
l. A description of the normal plant oper--
ating organization. 
2. A description of the onsite emergency 
response organization with a detailed discus-
sion of: 
a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties 
of the indlvldual<sl who will take charge 
during an emergency; 
b. Plant staff emergency assignments; 
c. Authorities, responslbillties, and duties 
on an onslte emergency coordinator who 
shall be In charge of the exchange of infor-
mation with offs!te authorities responsible 
for coordinating and implementing offslte 
emergency measures. 
3. A description, by position and function 
to be performed, of the licensee's headquar-
ters personnel who will be sent to the plant 
site to augment the onsite emergency orga-
nization. 
4. Identification, by position and function 
to be performed, of persons within the li-
censee organization who will be responsible 
for making offsite dose projections, and a 
description of how these projections will be 
made and the results transmitted to State 
and local authorities, NRC, and other ap-




>. Identification, by position and function 
be perfonned. of other employees of the 
ensee with special qualifications for 
ping with emergency conditions that may 
i.se. Other persons with special qua.lifica-
>ns, such as consultants, who are not em-
oyees of the licensee and who may be 
lied upon for assistance for emergencies 
all also be identified. The special qua.llfi-
tions of these persons shall be described. 
6. A description of t~e local offsite serv-
~ to be provided in support of the licens-
's emergency organiza,tlon. 
7. Identification of. and assistance expect-
! from, appropriate State, local. and Feder-
agencies with responsibilities for coping 
•th emergencies. 
8. Identification of the State and/or local 
flcials responsible for planning for, order-
g. and controlling appropriate protective 
:Uons, including evacuations when neces-
.ry. 
B. Assessment Actions 
The means to be used for detennining the 
.agnltude of and for continually assessing 
1e Impact of the release of radioactive ma-
·rlals shall be described, including emer-
~ncy action levels that are to be used as 
·iteria for detenninlng the need for notifi· 
•tion and participation of local and State 
Jencies, the Commission, and other Feder-
! agencies, and the emergency action levels 
1at are to be used for detenninln& when 
nd what type of protective measures 
1ould be considered within and outside the 
te boundary to protect health and safety. 
he emergency action levels shall be based 
n in-plant conditions and instrumentation 
, addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. 
'hese emergency action levels shall be dis· 
.lli&ed and agreed on by the applicant and 
tate and local governmental authorities 
nd approved by NRC. They shall also be 
~viewed with the State and local govem-
lental authorities on an annual basis. 
C. Activation of Emergency Organization 
10 Cfl Ch. I 
shall Include: < ll notification of unusual 
events, (2) alert, <3> site area emergency, 
and <4> general emergency. These classes 
are further discussed In NUREG-0654; 
FEMA-REP-1. 
D. Notification Procedures 
1. Admlntstrative and physical means for 
notifying local, State, and Federal officials 
and agencies and agreements reached with 
these officials and agencies for the prompt 
notification of the public and for public 
evacuation or other protective measures, 
should they become necessary, shall be de-
scribed. This description shall include Iden-
tification of the appropriate officials, by 
title and agency, of the State and local gov-
ernment agencies within the EPZs. • 
2. Provisions shall be described for yearly 
dissemination to the public within the 
plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emer-
gency planning information, such as the 
methods and times required for public noti-
fication and the protective actions planned 
If an accident occurs, general infonnation as 
to the nature and effects of radiation, and a 
listing of local broadcast stations that will 
be used for dissemination of information 
durin& an emergency. Signs or other meas-
ures shall also be used to disseminate to any 
transient population within the plume expo-
sure pathway EPZ appropriate lnfonnatlon 
that would be helpful if an accident occurs. 
3. A licensee shall have the capability to 
notify responsible State and local govern-
mental agencies within 15 minutes after de-
claring an emergency. The licensee shall 
demonstrate that the State/local officials 
have the capability to make a public notlfi· 
cation decision promptly on being lnfonned 
by the licensee of an emergency condition. 
By February l, 1982, each nuclear power re-
actor licensee shall demonstrate that admin-
istrative and physical means have been es-
tablished fm: alerting and providing prompt 
instructions to the public within the plume 
EPZ. The four-month 
2> for the 
deficiencies shall 
installation thill 
that ill ,...,..,.j.,.,.r~ 
Quiring. urgent actlonl to the more likely 
events where there Is substantial time avail-
able for the State and local governmental 
officials to make a judgment whether or not 
to activate the public notification system. 
Where there is a decision to acUvate the no-
tification system, the State and local offi-
cials will determine whether to activate the 
entire notification system simultaneously or 
in a graduated or staged manner. The re-
sponsibility for activating such a public no-
tification system shall remain with the ap-
propriate governmental authorities. 
E. Emergency Facilities and Equipment 
Adequate provisions shall be made and de-
scribed for emergency facilities and equip-
ment, including: 
1. Equipment at the site for personnel 
monitoring; 
2. Equipment for detennining the magni-
tude of and for continuously assessing the 
impact of the release of radioactive materi-
als to the environment; 
3. Facilities and supplies at the site for de-
contamination of onslte Individuals; 
4. Facilities and medical supplies at the 
site for appropriate emergency first aid 
treatment; 
5. Arrangements for the services of physi-
cians and other medical personnel qualified 
to handle radiation emergencies on-site; 
6. Arrangements for transportation of 
contaminated injured individuals from the 
site to specifically Identified treatment fa-
cilities outside the site boundary; 
7. Arrangements for treatment of individ-
uals injured in support of licensed activities 
on the site .at treatment facilities outside 
the site boundary; 
8. A licensee onsite technical support 
center and a licensee near-site emergency 
operations facility from which effective di-
rection can be given and effective control 
can be exercised during an emergency; 
9. At least one onslte and one oftsite com-
munications system; each system allall have 
a bacl!;up power source. 
AU communication plans shi!JI 
rangements for emergencies, 
near-site emergency facility; 
among the nuclear the prim 
State and local emergency operations 
ters, and the field assessment teams. ~ 
communications systems shall be tested 
nually. 
d. Provtslons for communications by 
licensee with NRC Headquarters and 
appropriate NRC Regional Office 0 
atlons Center from the nuclear power 1 
tor control room, the onslte technical 
port center. and the near-site emergenc~ 
eratlons facility. Such communications s 
be tested monthly. 
F. Tratning. 
The program to provide for (1) the tr 
ing of employees and exerctsing, by peri 
drills, of radiation emergency plans 
ensure that employees of the licensee 
iamillar with their specific emergency 
sponse duties, and (2) the participatiOI 
the training and drills by other pen 
whose asststance may be needed in 
event of a radiation emergency shall be 
scribed. This shall include a descriptiO! 
specialized Initial training and periodic 
training programs to be provided to eacl 
the following categories of emergency 
sonnel: 
a. Dtrectors and/or coordinators of 
plant emergency organization; 
b. Personnel responsible for accident 
sessment, Including control room shift 
sonnel; 
c. Radiological monitoring teams; 
d. Fire control teams (fire brigades); 
e. Repair and damage control teams; 
f. First aid and rescue teams; 
g. Medical support peroonnel; 
h. Licensee's headquarters support 
sonnel; 
l. Security personnel. 
In addition, a rawological oriental 
training shall be made avallabl 
local local emer1 
Defense, law enfo 





32, are in 
preparedness on a bien-
cl f•-•'"''"•"'" The level of participation 
all be as 
a) A State shall at least partially partici-
te in each offslte exercise at each site. 
bl A State shall fully participate in at 
.st one offslte exercise every 2 years. 
cl At least once every 7 years, all States 
thin the plume exposure pathway EPZ 
· a given site must fully participate In an 
!site exercise for that site. This exercise 
lSt also Involve full participation by local 
vernments within the plume exposure 
thway EPZ. 
d) Partial participation by a local govem-
'nt during an offsite exercise for a site is 
~eptable only when the local government 
fully participating In a biennial exercise 
another site. 
Ke part In testing their Integrated capabll-
, to adequately access and respond to an 
cident at a commercial nuclear power 
ant. "Full participation" Includes testing 
e major observable portions of the onslte 
,d offsite emergency plans and moblllza-
m of State, local and licensee personnel 
,d other resources In sufficient mumbers 
vertfy the capability to respond to the ac-
jent scenario. 
• "Partial participation" when used In con-
nction with emergency preparedness exer-
.es for a particular site means appropriate 
fsite authorities shall actively take part in 
e exercise sufficient to test direction and 
ntrol functions; Le .. <a> protective action 
·cision making related to emergency action 
vels, and <b> communication capabilities 
nong affected State and local authorities 
1d the licensee. 
5. All training, including exercises, 
for formal critiques in order to !den-
weak or deficient areas that need cor-
on. Any weaknelllles or deficiencies that 
are Identified shall be corrected. 
G. Maintaining Emergency Preparedness 
Provisions to be employed to ensure that 
the emergency plan, its Implementing proce-
dures, and emergency equipment and sup-
plies are maintained up to date shall be de-
scribed. 
H. Recover)! 
Criteria to be used to determine when. fol-
lowing an accident, reentry of the facility 
would be appropriate or when operation 
could be resumed shall be described. 
V. blPLE.VENTlNG PROCEDURES 
No less than 180 days prior to the sched-
uled issuance of an operating license for a 
nuclear power reactor or a license to possess 
nuclear material one copy of the applicant's 
detailed :mplementlng procedures for its 
emergency plan shall be submitted to the 
Administrator of the appropriate NRC Re-
gional Office, specified In Appendix D of 
Part 20 of this chapter and two copies are to 
be sent to the Document Control Desk. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washing-
ton, DC 20555. Licensees who are authorized 
to operate a nuclear power facility shall 
submit one copy of any changes to the 
emergency plan or procedures to the Ad-
ministrator of the appropriate NRC Region-
al Office, specified in Appendix D. 10 CFR 
Part 20, and two copies to the Document 
Control Desk within 30 days of such 
changes. 
<Sees. 161b .. 1., and o., Pub. L. 83-703; 68 




WIISteS Will be 
produced the prior 5 
of this statement of 
radioactive wastes" 
wastes resulting from 
the first cycle solvent ex-
system. or equivalent, and the con-
centrated wastes from subsequent extrac-
tion cycles, or equivalent, In a facility for re-
processing irradiated reactor fuels.) High-
level liquid radioactive wastes shall be con-
verted to a dry solid as required to comply 
with this Inventory limitation, and placed in 
a sealed container prior to transfer to a Fed-
eral repository in a shipping cask meeting 
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 71. The 
dry solid shall be chemically, thermally, and 
radlolytically stable to the extent that the 
equilibrium pressure In the sealed container 
will not exceed the safe operating pressure 
for that container during the period from 
canning through a minimum of 90 days 
after receipt <transfer of physical custody) 
at the Federal repository. All of these high-
level radioactive wastes shall be transferred 
to a Federal repository no later than 10 
years following separation of fission prod-
ucts from the irradiated fuel. Upon receipt, 
the Federal repository will assume perma-
nent custody of these radioactive waste ma-
terials although industry will pay the Fed-
eral Government a charge which together 
with interest on unexpended balances will 
be designed to defray all costs of disposal 
and perpetual surveillance, the Department 
of Energy will take title to the radioactive 
waste material upon transfer to a Federal 
repository. Before retirement of the reproc-
essing plant from operational status and 
before termination of licensing pursuant to 
§ 50.82. transfer of all such wastes to a Fed-
eral repository shall be completed. Federal 
repositories, which will be limited in 
disposal or radioactive wastes, 
111 and decommissioning 
ln with the Com-
mission's regulations, including the require-
ments set out ln this appendix. 
6. With respect to fuel reprocessing plants 
already licensed, the licenses will be appro-
priately conditioned to carry out the pur-
poses of the policy stated above with respect 
to high-level radioactive fission product 
wastes generated after iilStallation of new 
equipment for interim storage of liquid 
wastes, or after installation of equipment 
required for solidification without Interim 
liquid storage. In either case, such equip-
ment shall be imtalled at the earliest practi-
cable date, taking into account the time re-
quired for design, procurement and installa-
tion thereof. With respect to such plants, 
the application of the policy stated in this 
appendix to existing wastes and to wa.:;tes 
generated prior to the Installation of such 
equipmem, will be the subject of a further 
rule making proceeding. 
<42 U.S.C. 2201, 2237; sec. 161, Pub. L. !l:J~ 
703; 68 Stat. 948 <42 U.S.C. 2201); sec. 201, 
Pub. L. 93-438. 88 Stat. 1242, <42 U.S.C 
584lll 
[35 FR 17533, Nov. 14, 1970. as amended at 
36 FR 5411, Mar. 23, 1971; 42 FR 20139. Apr 
18, 1977; 45 FR 14201, Mar. 5, 1980] 
APPENDIX G-FRACTURE TOUGHNESS 
REQUIREMENTS 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction and Scope 
II. Definitions 
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PART 238-cONTRACTS WITH 
liNES 
1 O:l and 238 of the 
NaHonahly Act. as nmcnded 
1228]. 
Dated: 2, 1985. 
Andrew C!mnichael, Jr .• 
Associate Commissioner, Examinations 
Immigration and Naturalization Sen·ice. 
!FR Doc. 65-11126 Filed 5-7--85; 8:45am] 





" between "7 CFR" and 
EFFECTIVE DATE: May 8. 1985. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Theresa W. Hajost, Attorney, Office of 
the General Counsel. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington. 
D.C. 20555; Telephone: (202} 634-1493. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: in Union 
of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 
1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit vacated the NRC's 1982 
amendment (47 FR 30232, July 13. 1982} 
to its emergency planning and 
preparedness regulations. 10 CFR 
50.47(a)(Z) (1984), which stated that 
emergency preparedness exercises were 
part of the operational inspection 
process and thus were not required for 
any initial licensing hearing or decision. 
The court held that "Congress did not 
grant the Commission discretion to 
remove so material an issue as the 
results of offsite emergency 
preparedness from reqauired section 
189(a) hearings." 735 F. 2d af1451. On 
January 7, 1985, the Supreme Court 
denied a petition for certiorari filed by 
several Utility-Intervenors in the case. 
and on January 30, 1985, the Court of 
Appeals formally vacated the 1982 
amendment. 
The basic effect of the court's decision 
and of the rule change which follows is 
that the results of pre-licensing 
emergency preparedness exercises may 
be subject to litigation before the 
Licensing Board. The revision does not 
change the general predictive nature of 
the Commission's findings on emergency 
planning and preparedness issues. 
Because the D.C. Circuit held that the 
Commission did not have the statutory 
authority to promulgate the 1982 
amendment, it is unnecessary to provide 
notice and an opportunity to comment 
on this revision, which should be viewed 
as an outgrowth of the 1982 rulemaking 
proceeding. For the same reason the 
Commission finds good cause for 
making the revision effective on 
publication in the Federal Register. The 
revision is an administrative change to 
conform the text of 10 CFR 50.47(a)(Z) to 
the result in the case. 
The court specifically focused on the 
last sentence added to 10 CFR 
50.47(a}(2) by the 1982 Amendment. 
Thus, this sentence is being deleted from 
10 CFR 50.47(a)(Z). 
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement 
This revised rule contains no 
information collection reuirements and 
therefore is not subject to the 
requirements of the PaperworL 
Reduction Act of 19fl0 (44 U.S.C. 3501 e! 
seq.]. 
Environmental impact: Categorical 
Exclusion 
The NRC has determined that this 
revised regulation is the type of action 
described in categorical exclusion 10 
CFR 51.2Z(c)(3). Therefore, neither an 
environmental impact statement no1 an 
environmental assessment has been 
prepared for this revised regulation. 
Moreover, when promulgating the 
original emergency planning and 
preparedness regulations in 1980, the 
NRC prepared an "Environmental 
Assessment for Final Changes to 10 CFR 
Part 50 and Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 
50. Emergency Planning Requirements 
for Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG--
0685. June 1980). and concluded that 
under the criteria of 10 CFR Part 51 an 
environmental impact statement was 
not required for the Commission's 
emergency planning and preparedness 
regulations, which included 10 CFR 
50.47(a)(Z).as hereby revised. 
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 2 
Antitrust. Classified information. Fire· 
prevention. Incorporation by reference. 
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear 
power plants and reactors, Penalty. 
Radiation protection. Reactor siting 
criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements. 
For the reasons set out in the 
preamble and under the authority of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 
the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 
as amended, and section 553 of Title 5 of 
the United States Code, the NRC is 
adopting the following revisions to 10 
CFR Par! 50. 
PART so-DOMESTIC LICENSING OF 
PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION 
FACILITIES 
1. The authority citation for Pari 50 
continues to resd as follows: 
Authority: Sees. 103, 104. 161, 182.. 183, 186. 
189.68Sta!.936,937,948.953.954, 955,956, as 
amended. sec. 234. 83 Stat. 1244. a& amended 
{42 ll.S.C. 2133. 2134. 2201. 2232. 2233, 2236. 
2Z39. 221l2); sees. 201, 202. 200. 68 Stnt. 1242. 
1244. 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841. 5842. 
5646). unless otherwise noted. 
Section 50.7 also issued under Put.. L 95-
601, sec. 10. 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). 
Sections 50.57(d). 50.56. 50.91, and 50.92 also 
issued under Pub. L 97-415. 96 Stat. 2071. 
2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239]. Section 50.78 also 
issued under sec. 122. 68 Stat 939 (42 ll.S.C. 
2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under 
sec. 184. 68 Stat. 954. as amended (42 U.S.C. 
2234). Sections 50.1(){)-50.102 also issued 
under sec. 186, 68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236). 
For the purposes of sec. 223. 68 Stat 958. II& 
amended (42 U.S.C. 2273). §§ 5010 (a) (h). 
and [c). 5044. 50.46. 50.48. 50.54. and 5C.BOii') 




19324 Federal Registe; / Vol. 50, No. 89 / Wednesday, May 8, 1985 / Rules and Regulations 
amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)): §§ 50.10 (b) and 
(c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. lOti. 68 
Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(i)): and 
§§ 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.73, 
and 50.78 are issued under sec. 161o, 68 Stat. 
%0, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)). 
2. In § 50.47, paragraph (a}(2) is 
revised to read as follows: 
§ 50.47 Emergency plans. 
(a} * * * 
(2) The NRC will base its finding on a 
review of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency [FEMA) findings 
and determinations as to whether State 
and local emergency plans are adequate 
and whether there is reasonable 
assurance that they can be implemented, 
and on the NRC assessment as to 
whether the applicant's onsite 
emergency plans are adequate and 
whether there is reasonable assurance 
that they can be implemented. A FEMA 
finding wiil primarily be based on a 
review of the plans. Any other 
information already available to FEMA 
may be considered in assessing whether 
there is reasonable assurance that the 
plans can be implemented. In any NRC 
licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding 
will constitute a rebuttable presumption 
on questions of adequacy and 
implementation capability. . . . 
Dated at Washington, D.C., this 3rd day of 
May 1985. 
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
John C. Hoyle, 
Assistant Secretary of the Commission. 
(FR Doc. 85-11162 Filed 5-7-85: 8:45am) 
BILLIHG CODE 7590-01-M 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
Comptroller of the Currency 
12 CFR Part 7 
[Docket No. 85-71 
Charitable Foundations and Charitable 
Contributions 
AGENCY: Comptroller of the Currency, 
Treasury. 
ACTION: Final rule. 
SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (Office) is rescinding its 
interpretive rulings on charitable 
foundations and charitable 
contributions, 12 CFR 7.7445 and 7.7479, 
respectively. Additionally. the Office is 
clarifying that a national bank may 
Pstablish Clifford trusts without seeking 
pnor approval. This final rule is 
i~t~nd~d to eliminate unnecessary 
hn11tattons on a national bank's 
charitable contributions. 
EFFECTIVE DATI: fum~ 7, 191:!5. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Ford Barrett. Assistant Director. 
Legislative and Regulatory Analysis 
Division, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, 490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW., 
Washington. D.C. 20219, (202) 447-1177. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
Background 
Twelve U.S.C. 24 (Eighth) provides 
that national banks may "contribute to 
community funds or to charitable. 
philanthropic, or benevolent 
instrumentalities conducive to public 
welfare." The Office interprets the 
statute as authorizing national banks to 
make charitable contributions and to 
establish charitable foundations. The 
statute does not limit charitable 
contributions except as the "board of 
directors may deem expedient and in 
the interests of the association .... " 
In 1957, the Office issued Interpretive 
Ruling 7220 concerning the 
establishment of charitable foundations. 
The ruling limited contributions by the 
bank to a charitable foundation to "the 
amount permitted by federal law as a 
deduction from income for the purpose 
of the federal tax on corporate income." 
In 1963, the ruling was renumbered as 
Interpretive Ruling 7445, and in 1971, it 
was codified at 12 CFR 7.7445 without 
substantive change. In 1971, the Office 
also issued the charitable contributions 
ruling. 12 CFR 7.7479. The latter ruling 
stated that a national bank's 
contributions should "not exceed that 
which is allowed by the Internal 
Revenue Service as a deduction from 
income." 
In 1978, the Office amended both 
interpretive rulings to include more 
specific limitations on a national bank's 
contributions to charity or to its 
charitable foundation. As a result, since 
1978 a national bank has been ll:mited to 
contributing each half-year "five percent 
of the sum of 'income before income 
taxes and securities gains or losses' and 
'Securities gains (losses). Gross' 
registered during the preceding calendar 
half-year." The Office imposed the five 
percent limitation to "prevent 
management of closely-held banks from 
contributing excessive sums to charities 
or foundations in which the bank's 
controlling stockholders had a personal 
interest." 43 FR 19831, 19832. 
Following the 1978 amendments, 
several banks have applied for 
exemptions from the limitations on the 
amount of their contributions to charity 
and to foundations. The Office usually 
approved these applications after 
determining that the contributions were 
consistrmt with safe Hnd sound banking 
national 
allowed as 
a deduction Internal Revenue 
Code. If a bank exceeds Code's 
deductible amount, the of 
directors should 
minutes. Such 
1an:~m~.Re of 12 
the 
take into account 







Assembly Committee on Utilities and Commerce 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING FOR 
CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS 
Wednesday, May 7, 1986 
Sacramento, California 
CHAIRWOMAN GWEN MOORE: This informational hearing 
responds to concerns raised by the severe accident at the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Powerplant in Soviet, Ukraine. 
The hearing will focus on emergency response planning, 
the complex of activities that occurs once a severe accidents at 
one of our nuclear powerplants has happened. 
One of the striking and disturbing things about the 
Russian accident was the obvious lack of a detailed emergency 
response plan that was afforded the citizens, and the accurate 
world information about the occurrence. We will be looking into 
what steps should be taken to protect the health of the public in 
the immediate vicinity of a nuclear powerplant, and what steps 
should be taken to protect the health of the public at a farther 
distance from the accident scene. 
The Russians clearly assumed that the design of their 
plant was such that a severe accident involving extensive damage 
to the core and large-scale release of radiation simply could not 
occur. Apparently, failing to thin about the unthinkable has not 
paid off for the Russians. 
Our system of nuclear regulation requires detailed 
emergency response planning, which by definition means assuming 
that the emergency will arise. Emergency response planning 
entails detailed cooperation between the utility, the state and 
local governments. It requires identifying health risks to the 
general public and developing procedures for reducing or 
eliminating them. Most important, it requires instilling good 
judgment in the persons who may be called upon to cope with the 
consequences of severe accidents. 
We will first hear witnesses from the Federal Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Emergency Management 
Administration (FEMA). 
Welcome. Please describe the emergency response plans 
and what's required of the utilities. There have been recent 
comments coming from the NRC that some of the plants are 
outdated. You may want to consider those factors when you make 
your presentation. 
MR. DEAN KUNIHIRO: Madam Chairperson and Members of the 
Committee, I'm Dean Kunihiro. I am State Liason Officer for the 
Nuclear Regulator Commission's Region 5 office in Walnut Creek. 
I am appearing before you today to provide you with a brief 
overview of the regulations governing emergency preparedness at 
the nuclear power facilities. 
In August of 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 




protective measures could be taken in the event of a radiological 
emergency at one of these licensed facilities. A copy of these 
regulations have been included with my testimony today. 
I'd like to highlight for you some of the major 
provisions of the Commission's emergency preparedness 
regulations. The Commission has determined that no NRC operating 
license for a nuclear powerplant will be issued unless the NRC 
finds that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective 
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological 
emergency. The NRC bases its findings on (1) an NRC assessments 
as to whether the licensees on-site emergency plans are adequate 
and whether there are capable of being implemented, and (2) on a 
review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) 
findings and determinations as to whether state and local 
governments' off-site emergency plans are adequate and whether 
there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented. 
The Commission's regulation extends emergency planning 
considerations to two "Emergency Planning Zone." One zone is 
related to direct exposure to radiation while the other is 
related to the exposure via the food chain. The exact size and 
configuration of these zones surrounding a given nuclear 
powerplant is determined by such conditions as demography, 
topography, land characteristics, access routes, and 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
3 
The final provision of the regulation is that which 
identifies the standards that both on-site and o£f-site emergency 
plans must meet. There are sixteen listed standards. These 
standards include a wide range of planning considerations that 
needs to be addressed in utility, state and local emergency 
response plans. They include, among other things, assignment or 
identification of primary emergency responsibilities, use of a 
standard emergency classification scheme, establishment of 
emergency notification procedure among organizations, as well as, 
members of the general public, establishment and maintenance of 
adequate emergency facilities and equipment, and provision for 
training of emergency response personnel to include the conduct 
of periodic emergency response exercises. 
The inspection enforcement program to ensure compliance 
with the Commission's regulations is implemented by the NRC's 
Region 5 office. 
To summarize, it is clear, based on the public record 
compiled during the emergency preparedness rulemaking, that 
on-site and off-site emergency preparedness, as well as, proper 
siting and engineering design features are needed to protect the 
health and safety of the public. It is also clear from the 
accident at Three Mile Island that the protection provided by 
siting and engineering design features must be bolstered by the 
ability to take protective measures during the course of an 





(even if they do not cause significant off-site radiological 
consequences) would affect the way the various state and local 
entities react to protect the public from any dangers associated 
with an accident. In order to discharge effective statutory 
responsibilities, the Commission must be assured that proper 
means and procedures will be in place to assess a course of an 
accident and its potential severity. The Commission must be 
assured that the NRC, other appropriate authorities, and the 
public will be notified property, and that adequate protective 
measures in response to actual or anticipated conditions can and 
will be taken. The Commission's emergency preparedness 
regulations were adopted to provide these necessary assurances. 
Madam Chairwoman, that concludes my prepared remarks. I 
would be pleased to answer any questions the Committee may have 
of me. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: The one thing that I want to clarify 
for the public is the NRC is on-site and FEMA would be the 
off-site kind of services. We have already heard from the 
on-site. Let's hear from the off-site. 
MR. NICK NIKAS: Madam Chairwoman, I am Nick Nikas from 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region 9 with 
offices in San Francisco. As you indicated, our focus of 
responsibility is an off-site emergency preparedness. The 
off-site emergency preparedness plans have been developed since 
the Three Mile Island incident that Dean referred to in his 
5 
testimony. The plans are supported by the extensive network of 
emergency response procedures, equipment and professional 
expertise that could be brought to bear in the event of an 
emergency at any nuclear powerplant in the state. 
Outside the boundaries of the powerplant, state and 
local governments have plans for addressing the effects of 
radiation, including the indirect effects that could be 
experienced through the contamination of the food chain. To test 
the viability of these plans, state and local governments are 
required to demonstrate a biannual field exercise and their 
ability to execute them. 
At the federal level, the Federal Radiological Emergency 
Response Plan provides for a coordinated response of federal 
agencies to assist state and local governments, protect people 
and the environment. The Federal Response Plan was tested in a 
major field exercise in 1984 and will be tested again in June of 
1987. powerplant has an alert and notification system that 
must be capable of notifying the public residing within 10 miles 
of the plant within 15 minutes after a decision to take a 
protective action has been reached. Sirens, tone alert radios, 
and the emergency broadcast system are key ingredients of this 
lity. Other facilities and plan activities contribute to 
off-site preparedness, including emergency operating centers, 
radiation measuring services, agreements with medical facilities 
and other nearby organizations that can contribute to quick and 
effective responses. 
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To supplement the efforts of the utility, state and 
local governments and the federal government can deploy emergency 
response teams and an array of equipment to the scene of an 
emergency anywhere in the United States within hours. Through 
various training programs, hundreds of emergency response 
personnel from all levels of government and the utilities are 
receiving continuous training in appropriate response procedures. 
The following is a summary of what would happen in case of a 
serious accident at a nuclear powerplant in the United States. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN TERESA HUGHES: Question? 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Ms. Hughes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: You said that the federal 
government could provide emergency services within hours. 
MR. NIKAS: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: What could happen within hours? 
What do you mean? Where does the emergency service come from? 
Rancho Seco? 
MR. NIKAS: You're talking about the federal level now? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: Yes. 
MR. NIKAS: This is assuming that the incident reaches 
the proportions where the state and local governments ask for 
federal assistance? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: That's right. For example, they 
had a big blow up there, who makes the decision as to whether the 
federal government should be called right away? What is the 
mechanism before the federal government will respond? 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You might explain the state and local 
governments have the first line of responsibility. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: How severe does it have to be? 
You said within a matter of hours the federal government would 
respond. It may take the state and local government hours to 
decide they need federal intervention. Explain to me the 
mechanism before we get to that point. Will we all still be here 
while this bureaucracy is dealing with each other? 
MR. NIKAS: I can best do that by explaining how we in 
Region 9 would react to an incident or an accident at one of the 
plants in this state. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: Thank you. That's what I want to 
hear. 
MR. NIKAS: Our planning, which is pretty much in place, 
is being refined on a daily basis. Our interaction with the NRC 
and the state would allow us to know almost immediate that such 
an incident had occurred. This would alert the regional director 
or a senior member of his staff to immediately begin to mobilize 
the resources of the region and to muster staff. 
Our plan provides for us to assemble all the time that 
this intelligence is being developed and reported to us. The 
regional director probably within a matter of one or two hours, 
depending on how long it took him to get from wherever he is to 
his office, where we have an emergency operation center, whereby 
he could evaluate the information that was provided to him. He 
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could decide to deploy an emergency response team which would be 
comprised of people who are familiar with the kind of business we 
are talking about. They would immediately move to the scene of 
the accident. In Orange County, if it was at the San Onofre 
plant, San Luis Obispo, we would immediate interact with the 
state and local officials present, gain intelligent, learn as 
much as we could about the nature of the incident. That 
information would be fed back to the regional director who would, 
in all of this time, be in contact with the federal officials at 
the national level. By this time, he would be operating out of 
an emergency information coordination center at our Washington 
offices. They are operational around the clock. Depending upon 
the nature of the incident, we could deploy resources from the 
region, from the national level to wherever they are located to 
the scene of the accident. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: How large is the region? 
MR. NIKAS: Region 9? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: Yes. How large is Regional 9? 
MR. NIKAS: It's California, Arizona, Nevada, Hawaii and 
the Pacific basin. 
We could probably have people deploy on airplanes and to 
the accident site within five or six hours. This would depend in 
large measure on the ability of other federal agencies that react 
to FEMA's guidelines, because we are a coordinating agency to do 
things that they are prepared to do. We have rehearsed and 
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continue to plan in the event of this type of accident. I am 
confident, based on our training and experience, we could deploy 
a response to a serious accident within a matter of 10 hours. We 
are required at the the Region to be able to move into a federal 
response center that would be activated and capable of operations 
within 6 to 12 hours depending on how far it is from the Region, 
or whether we have to fly, drive, etc. That is our requirement, 
and we can meet that requirement. 
It would obviously take longer for resources from the 
east coast to come out here, or from the Nevada test site, to 
board on airplanes and move to the scene of the accident. But, 
the regional itself is required by our own federal regulations to 
be prepared to move into a federal response center and be 
operational within 6 to 12 hours. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE. Do you conduct a biannual drill? 
MR. NIKAS: Biannual drills are done by local and state 
governments. They are for the purpose of testing their plans. 
We tested our federal response plan in 1984, and will test it 
again in 1987. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Is that a three year occurrence? 
MR. NIKAS: I don't think it has been established on a 
three years cycle. What happened is we began developing the 
Federal Emergency Response Plan right after Three Mile Island. 
We got a chance to look at the effectiveness of our response. We 
worked on this plan and decided in 1984 we were prepared to go on 
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the street with it, so to speak. We wanted to test it first. We 
found weaknesses in the Plan, obviously. Those weaknesses are 
being corrected. We are working on improving the Plan. We 
expect to have it in condition to test it again in 1987. 
There is also the problem of funding. It is a very 
expensive proposition. We do it when we have the resources. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Your biannual plan would require that 
all the agencies involved go through the whole process? 
MR. NIKAS: Yes. Absolutely. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN GLORIA MOLINA: How do you score on that 
drill? In 1984, you had a certain test and evaluation that was 
done on preparedness. 
MR. NIKAS: Of the federal plan, yes. 
ASSEMBLY MOLINA: What would have been the ultimate 
score? 
MR. NIKAS: I don't know what the score was. I don't 
think there was a score. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: How did you·evaluate it then? 
MR. NIKAS: The organization provided for evaluators and 
controllers. It's a typical standard exercise scenario where you 
have players. You have a script. You have controllers. You 
have evaluators. All of those people go into conducting an 
exercise. There are certain standards that are prescribed in the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FEMA regulations. There are 
certain things we must be able to do. The evaluators judge on 
the basis of performance. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: That is what I'm trying to get 
at. How did you score in 1984? 
MR. NIKAS: I don't know. I don't have that information 
with me. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Who would have that information? 
Aren't you the Region 9 representative? 
MR. NIKAS: The exercise itself was not conducted in 
Region 9. It was conducted at Saint Lucy, Florida. That 
information is available. We could get it. However, I don't 
have it with me, because I never expected to have to answer that 
question. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: I think that would be one of our 
concerns. There are certain procedures. Region 9 has procedures 
are are established and coordinated through local and state 
government. Everybody has a role they play with regard to any 
kind of an emergency. The real test is going to be when it 
actually happens. That is when the whole network will be able to 
move and coordinate quick enough to meet the emergency. I don't 
know in any of the testing procedures that have ever been 
produced whether anyone really met the whole goal of providing 
for the full safety of everyone within an exposed area. Even 
though you go through the testing procedures, it is interesting 
to know what evaluation was used. 
MR. NIKAS: I think I understand your question. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Ts there a state and local 
government responsibility for the coordination not being met?. 
Everybody is going to look to government to provide the safety. 
That doesn't mean it is a federal responsibility, a state 
responsibility, or a local responsibility. Everybody is going to 
look at just government to provide that kind of safety. My 
concern is as you do your evaluation, what was the test results? 
This test was not done in our area, so how is it tested (i.e., 
Rancho Seco) in an emergency situation? 
HR. NIKAS: My comments were relative to the federal 
emergency response plan. I thought that was your question. I 
can answer your question if you will give me the opportunity. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Sure. 
MR. NIKAS: In regards to testing the plans of the state 
and local jurisdictions, those are the exercises conducted 
biannually. Those exercises are evaluated to determine whether 
or not the plans are effective, valid, viable, and whether or not 
in their execution indicates they will reasonably provide for the 
protection and welfare of the residents living near the plant. 
They are a matter of record. The procedure is prescribed and the 
evaluating agency initiate it. The Federal Emergency Management 
makes findings and gives them to the Nuclear Regulation 
Commission who use those findings upon which to base their own 
findings. They make that determination if these plans are 
adequate. They also indicate from the basis of the performance 
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that the jurisdictions and utilities involved can, in fact, 
protect and provide for the welfare of the residence around the 
area. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: So, when was your last test for 
Rancho Seco? 
MR. NIKAS: I don't know for sure. Just a minute. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We will hear from the utilities and 
they can answer that question for you, Ms. Molina. 
MR. NIKAS: It was in 1984. The next one is scheduled 
in October. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: It's the federal government, in 
my understanding, ultimate responsible, particularly in Region 9. 
They prescribe to the state and local government in order to meet 
all the standards that are set. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: The NRC establishes the standards, 
both the on-site and off-site. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: When was the last evaluation for 
Rancho Seco? If it has any kind of score level, where did it 
score? What were the problems? 
MR. NIKAS: If I had known you were going to ask those 
kinds of questions, I would have come prepared with the 
documentation to try to answer them. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Why don't you try to get that 
information for the Committee? 
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MR. NIKAS: I can tell you the information is available. 
That was the reason the plant, at the time the test was done, was 
allowed to continue to operate. The local jurisdictions, 
off-site, the stand plans and their demonstration showed that the 
plans were adequate. We then could reasonably conclude that in 
the event of an accident, those jurisdictions could provide for 
the safety and welfare of the people. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: I don't mean to be disrespectful • 
However, when each of us look at any of these situation, we are 
talking about public safety. There are many regulations. There 
are many jurisdictions. It would be nice if we could just turn 
away from our constituents and say, "It is not my responsibility. 
It is the federal or local responsibility." However, the reality 
is that each of us have a responsibility to provide safety. How 
do people know there is safety? We can't just turn around and 
say, "Region 9 is responsible for that or the utilities are 
responsible for that." It is hard to evaluate. How can we 
measure safety from any of these tests? 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Ms. Molina, this may be helpful. In 
some extent, the state and others are preempted by what is set 
forth by the NRC. In some instances where you may wish to help, 
you may not. Maybe the NRC can clarify their role for us in 
terms of the state's responsibility as it relates to standards. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: I'm not looking so much for 
standards. I'm saying standards are already there. They develop 
new standards every time they test. Right? 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: No, wrong. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: You have already established all 
of the ultimate standards for state and local government 
response? 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Right. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Then, how did they test in the 
last drill? 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me see if I can help you a little 
bit. What he is trying to get you to see is that those standards 
are established in order to get your license to build a nuclear 
powerplant. You have to include as part of the package your 
emergency response plan. The NRC then evaluates that plan to see 
if it meets all the criteria they have in terms of providing 
safety. You might tell us how you may change or update your 
emergency response plan. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Ms. Moore, what kind of safety 
are we providing for the public? What is our responsibility in 
order to ensure that kind of safety? We are talking about 
nuclear powerplants that have been built with cost overruns. 
They had tremendous plans and regulations, and look at the price 
of what we are playing for them. The issue is you can have fine 
regulation, you can have fine reports, and you can present to us 
all the jurisdictional roles everybody plays, but the question is 
when was your last test? How well did you test? What needs to 




Everybody can have rules and regulations, plans and 
everything else. The reason I ask the questions is because I 
used to serve as deputy director for HEW (Health, Education and 
Welfare Department) in Region 9. We had a role we played. I 
know that in the last test, we were pretty miserable. It was 
never evaluated on the kinds of protections of what I think the 
public is going to demand. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's have the NRC enter back into 
this discussion, because they are the guys your questions ought 
to be directed to. They set forth how all of this takes place. 
Obviously, one of the concerns here is how do you update your 
plan? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: The NRC is responsible for making an 
evaluation about the utilities ability to respond to an 
emergency, both in the evaluation list plans and the evaluation 
of their ability to respond to those plans. The NRC looks to 
FEMA to make that similiar evaluation for state and local 
governments. In doing so, FEMA renders a report to the NRC. Ms. 
Molina, you asked what the score was for the most recent Rancho 
Seco exercise. There are no scores per se. There are no 
numerical value scores as we would have a score on an exam for 
example. On the other hand, the results of the exercise 
evaluation are documents, and I'm sure FEMA would be happy to 
provide you with a copy of the most recent Rancho Seco report. 
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In that report, to my recollection, FEMA concluded that 
the plans and preparedness as it relates to the off-site at 
Rancho Seco, were adequate in order to protect public health and 
safety. They did find, in the course of their evaluation, 
certain problem areas, and identified those problems in the 
report. FEMA looks to the state and local government to make 
changes and fix the problem areas as were identified. Again, the 
point I'm making is there is no quantitative score as a result of 
those evaluations. There is a report rendered. I believe FEMA 
would be most pleased to provide you with a copy of the most 
recent Rancho Seco report. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: So, the accountability lies 
where? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: The accountability lies at the state and 
local government level for the protection of public health and 
safety, and to make those decisions necessary for the protection 
of the public health and safety. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Could we legislate in that area? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: I am not an expert on preemption matters. 
It is my belief that the state has, in fact, legislated in that 
particular area, and can do additional things that is deemed 
necessary. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Sher? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BRYON SHER: Are you telling us that the 





and that the sanction, if its not being implement, would be the 
plant would have to close down until that was in place? Does the 
state have that kind of power or has that been preempted by the 
federal government? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: I am not a preemption expert. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: You would welcome the state 
constructing an emergency response requirement? Would you feel 
confident that you could meet it? 
MR. KUNIHIRO?: No, that is not what I'm saying. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: I'm not sure we have that power, 
Madam Chair. We share the concern, but we don't have the power. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: There are also some concerns you 
don't think it is important consider Diablo being built on a 
fault. You being the NRC. Would state government have any 
authority to go back and revisit and take a look at Diablo? The 
people of the State of California would have a real concern with 
Diablo sitting on an earthquake fault. 
MR. KUNIHIRO: If I might correct that last statement, 
Madam Chairwoman. The NRC considers it extremely important that 
a plant may be prone to earthquakes. It was the NRC's 
determination that additional safety features be built into the 
facility, and that was done. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: It is okay to build on a fault as 
long as you include additional safety features which you say the 
evaluation process is somewhat questionable. You're also saying 
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that you approved the plant being on a fault since they took the 
additional safety precautions. 
MR. KUNIHIRO: The plant was built to withstand the most 
incredible earthquake in that particular area. That was the 
finding of the NRC. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I won't even go into how do you know. 
MR. KUNIHIRO: The plant was built to extraordinary 
standards that are not normally applied to the plants not built 
in the proximity of earthquake faults. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Or, built directly on a fault. Are 
there other questions of FEMA or FERC? Mr. Hauser? 
ASSEMBLYMAN DAN HAUSER: I just have one basis question. 
Both state and federal governments are substantially in a cutback 
mode right now as far as funding is concerned. Do the proposed 
cuts have a detrimental effect on either FEMA or the NRC in your 
ability to carry out the safety functions? 
MR. NIKAS: I can respond for FEMA. I can honestly say 
that will not be allowed to happen. As a matter of fact, a 
specific effort is being made to ensure that all resources needed 
by the federal emergency management regions to carry out their 
responsibility of evaluating state and local exercises will be 
made available. We may suffer in other areas, but it is clear 
that those resources will be made available to us. Although we 
may not be able to travel any place else, we will be coming to 
Sacramento, San Luis Obispo, and Orange County to conduct the 




MR. KUNIHIRO: There have been similarly no reductions, 
from the NRC's standpoint, impacting on its 
inspection/enforcement program in the area of emergency response. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER: You don't envision any? 
MR. NIKAS: No, I don't. 
MR. KUNIHIRO: At this time, we do not envision any. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Is there any attempt to go back and 
maybe take a look, revisit, and update the plants, or is it only 
done as you go through your biannual drills? As new information 
becomes available, is there some attempt to have them expand or 
change their response plan by the NRC or FEMA? 
MR. NIKAS: Yes. In regard to emergency planning, a 
case in point is what happened immediately after Three Mile 
Island. There were standards and criteria for planning and 
off-site preparedness. Let me put it this way, we provided 
guidance to the state and local jurisdictions for the development 
of their off-site plans. Immediately after Three Mile Island, 
those criteria were changed. They were much more stringent. The 
requirements increased dramatically. I could say without fear of 
contradiction if there is clear evidence that the standards as 
they exist are inadequate, they would be changed to take those 
requirements into account. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You would have the authority to have 
that done? 
MR. NIKAS: Yes. 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I want to thank you, unless there are 
some other questions of these witnesses. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Are you the NRC representative? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: What about those facilities in the 
United States that don't have double containments? Have you been 
look at that? For example, those facilities like the Soviet 
facilities is where weapons were made and not utilities. Is that 
something the NRC is looking at now? Are there any of those in 
California? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: There is one graphite moderate reactor, a 
much small reactor which is not of the same design as the 
Chernobyl reactor, in the State of California. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Without the containment wall or 
barriers? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: There is no containment at that 
particular ility. 
located? 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: You care to tell us where that is 
MR. KUNIHIRO: It is the G.E. facility at Vallecitos. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Is the NRC looking at those and in 
1 of the Soviet accident, may impose further requirements? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: The NRC will make every effort to learn 
from the Soviet accident. However, at this time, we do not have 
any information. I think it is premature to speculate how that 
accident might impact on any of the NRC's regulations. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: You are trying to learn from it? It 
might lead to some changes? Particularly in so-called graphite 
without the barrier walls or containment is under review at the 
NRC now? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: The NRC has appointed a staff of its most 
senior scientists to evaluate the Chernobyl accident to determine 
what impacts that accident will have on regulatory changes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Will that be a subject of a report to 
the Commissioners or a hearing? Has that been determined? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: That has not been determined yet. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: If there are changes, how would that 
be handled? 
MR. KUNIHIRO: The changes would most likely come in the 
form of rulemaking, and it would go through the normal NRC 
rulemaking procedures. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We thank you for your testimony, and 
appreciate you taking the time to come down and talk to us. 
MR. KUNIHIRO: You're welcome. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Our next panel will be the Sacramento 
Municipal Utility District (SMUD), Southern California Edison, 
and Pacific, Gas & Electric (PG&E). 
In the essence of time, why don't we have each of you 
make a brief opening statement? Please identify yourselves and 
the utility you are representing for the record. 
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MR. STU WILSON: Madam Chairwoman and Members of the 
Committee, I am Stu Wilson representing SMUD (Sacramento 
Municipal Utility District). I have Robert Myers with me today. 
I want to make a minor correction in your agenda. Mr. Myers is 
the Director of Emergency Planning. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STEVE PEACE: Rancho Seco never runs anyway. 
How can anything happen to it? 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We will have to let them tell us 
about that. Mr. Peace is saying since Rancho Seco is always 
down, we don't have to worry about an nuclear accident. 
MR. ROBERT MYERS: Madam Chairwoman and Members of the 
Committee, my name is Robert Myers. I am the Supervisor of 
Emergency Preparedness for the Sacramento Municipal Utility 
District (SMUD). Rather than read the prepared testimony, I will 
make a brief statement. 
One of the major responsibilities of my job at SMUD is 
to provide for coordination of the District Emergency Response 
P for Rancho Seco with jurisdictions over the counties of San 
Joaquin, Sacramento, Amador and the State of California's 
emergency response plan. We have, in the past several years, 
held joint exercises with the three counties and the state. They 
have been evaluated by the federal government. This past year, 
we had an exercise with the utility alone. The rule for 
exercises have changed at the federal level. They needed only to 





or October 8th of this year. It is going to be an extensive 
exercise to thoroughly exercise the plans of all three 
jurisdictions and the utility. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's hear from PG&E (Pacific, Gas 
and Electric Company) • 
MR. JIM SHEPHERD: Good afternoon, my name is Jim 
Shepherd. I'm Vice President of Nuclear Power Generation for 
PG&E (Pacific, Gas and Electric Company). On my left, I have 
with me Warren Fujimoto who is the Supervising Engineer in my 
department. He is responsible for emergency planning. On my 
right is Bruce Norton, licensing attorney retained by PG&E. 
We prepared a brief written statement which we will pass 
out to the Committee. I would like to make a few remarks by way 
of summary, and then answer any questions you may have. 
At the outset, we have been following the news of the 
unfortunate accident at Chernobyl. I can assure you that as more 
information comes available, we expect to be working with others 
and gaining any lessons learn from this experience. I can also 
assure you that PG&E is first and foremost committed to safety of 
those people who work at Diablo Canyon and live in the 
surrounding community. 
Assurance of safety requires a multi-facet approach. In 
the nuclear industry, we call that "defense in depth." It starts 
with a sound and thorough review of plant design to guarantee the 
health and safety of the public and the workers at the 
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powerplant.. It is really a three phrase process. It requires a 
thorough and well design plant with the first criteria being 
safety. The plant requires a well training plant staff and 
comprehensive support organization. In addition, it requires 
thorough emergency planning, which of course, what we are here to 
ta about today. 
We begin our emergency planning efforts for Diablo 
Canyon in 1973. Throughout this process, we worked very closely 
with state and local officials; not only in the development of 
our plans, but in the development of their plans. As we sit here 
today, I can tell you we have a series of comprehensive 
compatible plans for not only Diablo Canyon, but also the local 
agencies in that area. It has been a cooperative effort, and 
that is an ex~emely important factor. We know their people and 
they know our people. We have built up an atmosphere of mutual 
confidence and trust. As you know, this enables us to work well 
as a team in the exercises we have had. 
As you also know, teamwork is probably the most 
important single factor in managing an emergency. There are 
several key elements with the plan. We have provided extensive 
emergency facilities, both at the plant site and off-site. 
One feature of our plant is we have an emergency 
facility located off-site, near the Sheriff's office in San Luis 
Obispo County. That is used by both the county and PG&E for 




about that particular facility is it was activated last year by 
the county as part of an effort to fight those devastating fires 
that occurred in the San Luis Obispo area. The emergency workers 
from the county who utilized that facility said it was a very key 
element in their overall ability to respond to that emergency. 
We, like the other powerplants, have spent a good deal 
of time in the area of public information in the event of an 
emergency. We, of course, have procedures for notifying a county 
agency in the first fifteen minutes after an accident. We have 
installed an emergency warning system consisting of 129 sirens 
that blankets the emergency planning zone out to about 20 miles 
from the plant. Thirteen (13) radio stations are coordinated to 
gather an emergency broadcast system in the San Luis Obispo area. 
Our emergency plan calls for the formation of our 
extensive media center, which is physically located right next to 
the emergency operation center. We have everything all in the 
general location. We, like other plants, have made extensive 
provisions for primarily assessment for radiological conditions. 
We are a network of implant radiation monitors and fixed monitors 
out in the environment that transmits into the emergency 
operation center (the central command post). We have emergency 
teams available. These teams, by the way, are joint with PG&E 
teams. Our teams aren't just PG&E, county teams. They are 
joint. We have local environmental monitoring laboratories with 
the latest state-of-the-art radiological equipment that is 
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jointly manned by county and PG&E people available in that area. 
All of this information on radiological conditions will be 
transmitted back to the central emergency operation facility 
where experts from all affected agencies (PG&E, the county, the 
NRC and the State of California) gather together in one location 
which we call the "unified does assessment center." Together, we 
come out with a single unified consistent set of recommendations 
for handling the emergency or responding to the emergency from a 
radiological condition. 
We think this is a very important feature of our plans, 
because it eliminates the confusion caused by conflicting reports 
and recommendations. Finally, like all other utilities, we 
train. We have ten joint agency drills. Drills that involve 
local officials as well as PG&E officials, state and county. 
That is basically two a year for the last five years. In 
addition to that, we have had numerous training sessions with our 
own people, the county and state people on specific aspects of 
the planning (i.e., does assessments and monitoring). All of our 
experiences have been judged to be extremely successful. 
In summary, we have a comprehensive set of plans in the 
San Luis Obispo area and for the local county. They can be used 
for not only an accident or emergency at the plant, but for fire, 
flood, or earthquakes. Thank you. 
MR. FRANCIS C. JACKLEY: Good afternoon. I'm F. C. 




the Southern California Edison Company. One of my prime 
responsibilities is the coordination of emergency plans for the 
site and off-site agencies. We, like other utilities, have an 
emergency plan that we are very proud of. 
There is one item that I would like to bring to your 
attention. San Onofre, the three units, are located on a 84 acre 
site, entirely on Camp Pendleton Marine Base, a federal property. 
In San Diego County, our nearest city is about three (3) miles 
north, which is the City of San Clemente. Our three units (with 
Unit One going on line in 1968, Unite Two in 1983 and 1984), 
combine capacity to serve about four million people. We have a 
plan that has been active since 1986. The plan has been revised 
and improved after Three Mile Island in 1980. 
One of the items we are very proud of is called, "The 
Interjurisdictional Planning Committee." This is a group of 
individuals, not only the utility, located off-site in the Cities 
of San Clemente, San Juan Capistrano and Orange and San Diego 
counties, Camp Pendleton Marine Base, and the California State 
Park. They meet monthly and review, update, revise and talk 
about the emergency plan as it relates to San Onofre and the 
off-site. 
That is about as abbreviated as I can make it. We do 
have an EOS and TSC. I will leave it at that. Thank you. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Ms. Molina? Then, Ms. Hughes, Mr. 
Hauser and finally, Mr. Sher. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: I have the same question that I 
posed to the previous witnesses. In this test, could you provide 
for the total safety of the public in its surrounding area in an 
emergency? 
MR. JACKLEY: That's really the finally bottom line of 
the report. That has to be the conclusion that FEMA and the NRC 
reach or you would, for all practical purposes, flunk the test. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: That's what I'm trying to figure 
out. How is it measured? They said there is no rating. There 
is no score. How is safety measured then? 
MR. JACKLEY: It is generally measured by the exercised 
agreeing on a number of goals for that exercise, and things that 
you are going to test. There is a determination made by 
evaluators that are present at the exercise as to whether they 
think you met those goals. It is not done numerically. They 
said one of the criteria for this test is you must demonstrate 
your ability to collect and analyze environmental monitoring 
samples. You have to show that. They will have an evaluator 
a environmental monitoring team make a judgment on their 
technical expertise as to whether you did the test correctly or 
not. When they come to their final conclusions, they looked at 
all the objectives fundamentally. If you don't meet all of the 
objectives, you flunk the exercise. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: I know you would flunk, but what 
happens when you flunk? 
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MR. JACKLEY: It depends on the circumstances. You 
really should be asking that question of the NRC. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: They told to to ask you. 
MR. JAMES SHIFFER: No, they didn't. If they come up 
with a finding that we could not protect the health and safety of 
the general public, the ball would be in their court as to what 
they would want to do. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Let me just quickly try to get to 
my point, because everybody is going to pass the ball to the 
other again. 
MR. SHIFFER: I'm trying to answer the question. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: The ultimate public safety in the 
assessment score evaluation, if anyone stops you from continuing 
that test, what do they do? 
MR. BRUCE NORTON: Jim, let me take a crack at that. 
First of all, there is not just a single plan. I think that is 
important to understand. There is a utility plan. There is a 
county plan. There is a state and federal plan. They are all 
integrated. The drills that we have once a year certainly 
implements the utility, the county and the state plans. Those 
are graded by FEMA and/or the NRC. As Mr. Shiffer said you could 
receiving a "flunking" grade. It's unacceptable. If your 
performance was unacceptable, you would have to fix the plant. 
You would have to immediately repair the plant. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: So, there is an accountability? 
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MR. NORTON: Absolutely. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: There is a certain standard 
within that evaluation process you must meet? 
MR. NORTON: Absolutely. If you think about it for a 
minute, makes sense it is not a multiple choice test where you 
come out with a score of 83%. For example, when they say you 
have to have the ability to evacuate people from the site in a 
reasonable length of time, you do a mock evacuation. They send 
in observers. Those professional observers rate you on whether 
or not you did that in a reasonable time. It isn't a score of 
83%, but it is either reasonable, unreasonable or unacceptable 
length of time for evacuation. In that sense, you are rated. 
These reports that FEMA was mentioned are very detailed. They 
spend a least a full day on the drills. They spend a great 
amount of time writing reports in great detail of each step of 
the operation: Who did what. Why? Who did what well? Who did 
what poorly. How you can improve? Those reports are available 
1 facilities. We have them at Diablo Canyon. I'm sure 
these gentlemen have them for San Onofre and SMUD. There are 
available to the public. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Again, in all of the assessment 
testing or evaluations that has been done up until now, 






MR. NORTON: For Diablo Canyon (to blow our horn for a 
moment, we don't get much chance to do that), even antinuclears 
have cited in other cases how good Diablo Canyon emergency plan. 
I'm thinking specifically of the Shoreham proceedings where Mr. 
Hubbard testified before this Committee in the past. He 
testified Diablo Canyon has an outstanding emergency plan, and if 
only Shoreham could only have one like that. It is a very good 
plan. It has a great deal of time, effort, thought and expense 
put into it. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: That one was tested and it came 
out outstanding? 
MR. NORTON: I think it is far to say that, yes. I 
think the word outstanding was probably used. Words like that, I 
will not use that exact word. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Should you not meet the minimum 
standards, the FEMA or NRC would evaluate and make changes? 
MR. NORTON: They can go so far as to suspend your 
license and prevent you from operating. 
MR. SHIFFER: That has never happened. The normal 
process, assuming that the deficiencies were not just terribly 
serious, require shutting the plant down. Normally, you get 
items identified called "deficiencies," which are expected to 
correct with 30 days and recommendations you can correct by the 
next exercise. 
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Is that also true of the other 
coordinate jurisdictions: local and state government? 
MR. SHIFFER: Yes. In general, FEMA's finding relates 
to the state and county. The NRC's finding relates to us. They 
both use a similiar system. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: They basically have 30 days. 
MR. SHIFFER: Thirty days of what they consider as major 
deficiencies. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOLINA: Major deficiencies? 
MR. SHIFFER: Right. 
MR. NORTON: It might help you also to understand that 
these emergency plans are not just for nuclear accidents. The 
emergency plan in San Luis Obispo County, for example, was 
totally derived from the nuclear plan. It was funded by the 
nuclear plan, the communication equipment, and the facilities. 
It was used, as Mr. Shiffer pointed out, in 1985 for the horrible 
fire they had last summer very successfully. It was tested. It 
was shown to work. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: When you say the utility, do you mean 
funded by the ratepayer? 
MR. NORTON: That's a good question. That is presently 
be the CPUC (California Public Utilities Commission) on who 
will fund it. However, it will probably be the shareholders or 
the ratepayers. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Hauser? 
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ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER: Does PG&E have a plan approved by 
the NRC for evacuation under the worst case scenario, an 
earthquake accident, for Diablo? 
MR. SHIFFER: I would have to say yes. 
MR. NORTON: The reason he is hesitating is because it 
isn't called an earthquake plan. The worst case scenario for 
earthquakes is contained within the plan. The answer is 
absolutely yes . 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER: Does that include potential 
earthquake damage to necessary roads? 
MR. NORTON: Absolutely. I can even give you the name 
of the consultant who did the work. It was a very large report 
and was factored in by the counties. The affects of the 
earthquakes on the emergency plan on evacuation from no effect to 
the worst credible earthquake. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER: When was the approved by the NRC? 
MR. NORTON: The emergency plan was approved by the NRC 
in either 1982 or 1983. I can't give you the exact date off the 
top of my head. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: This question is directed to SMUD. 
Do you have provisions in your plan for an earthquake? 
MR. MYERS: Yes. SMUD, like the other two utilities, 
provides for many common natural hazards. It is a comprehensive 
response plan. 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: It has nothing to do with the fact 
that Diablo is located on the fault. Is it considered in the 
overall plan? 
MR. MYERS: It is a generic requirement of all licensees 
to be able to address earthquakes. 
MR. NORTON: That has been said about three or four 
times. It is located 3~ miles. That is close enough to an 
earthquake fault. Right on and earthquake fault and 31 miles 
from an earthquake fault is quite different. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: It is the first time I heard you ever 
admit there was a fault there. 
MR. SHIFFER: We litigated that for a long time. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Id the court decide that? 
MR. SHIFFER: No, the court did not decide that issue. 
MR. NORTON: The plant is not right on an earthquake 
fault. That is an unfair characterization. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: It is not an unfair characterization. 
Maybe you disagree, but it is not unfair. We haven't defined 
what "on" is, Mr. Sher. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: I have a couple of questions I hope 
you won't regard as unfair. In the material that was furnished 
to us, there is a recent article from the Wall Street Journal 
following the accident in the Soviet Union. I assume you would 
disagree with the statements in that article. The first 




in the U.S., the emergency evacuation plans are outdated and 
could prove ineffective in the event of an accident." Arc they 
outdated? 
MR. SHIFFER: Not, not at all. 
ASSEMBLYl{AN SHER: Is the article incorrect? 
MR. SHIFFER: I'm only going to speak for Diablo. I 
feel confident the others are in the same situation as we are. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Each of you agree that Rancho Seco is 
up to date and effective? 
MR. MYERS: In my opinion, it is. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: A chemical engineer at Berkeley 
states in this article, "Scientists complain that the evacuation 
plans are further flawed because neither the government nor the 
nuclear industry have educated people in what happens during a 
nuclear accident." You can't communication that kind of 
information until there is a real emergency." The article speaks 
to how the plans are written in scientific and technical terms • 
People will not understand it. Are you required to actually hold 
a drill of pretending there is an nuclear accident in evacuating 
an area similiar to a fire drill held in an elementary school? 
MR. SHIFFER: The 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: 
about the technical people? 
answer is, to a limited extent, yes. 
Those are the support people. What 
MR. SHIFFER: We simulate evacuation of major areas. We 
have conducted limited scope evacuations primarily of certain 
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schools. However, we have not conducted major evacuations of the 
population. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Wouldn't that be useful if there was 
a meltdown on Sunday? You would then evacuate the people who 
would be normally evacuated in case of the real nuclear accident. 
MR. NORTON: Professor Shiffer has pointed out earlier 
when the large fire occurred in San Luis Obispo, our emergency 
plan was successful in an actual emergency situation. Fire was 
raging on both side of Highway 101 (the highway was ultimate 
closed), our plan was proved to be successful. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Were people evacuated from their 
homes? 
MR. NORTON: Yes, absolutely. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: That was due to a fire. I'm talking 
about a meltdown. I'm talking about this plan that shows a 10 
mile protection zone around the plant where'evacuation might be 
required. Did you have anything like that? 
MR. NORTON: The 10 mile zone around the plant is far, 
far less populated than the people we evacuated for the fire last 
summer. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Sher, part of what they keep tell 
us is the plan for the nuclear powerplant is the same for any 
ma or disaster in any county. What we are asking is there any 
special protective measures you implement for nuclear 
powerplants? 
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MR. NORTON: Most of us have included a 10 mile 
evacuation plan, because the State of California regulations 
require a much bigger basic emergency planning zone than 10 
miles. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: For the evacuation process? 
MR. NORTON: Absolutely. The minimum distance is 13 
miles and the maximum distance is over 20 miles, depending upon 
the direction, at Diablo Canyon. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: In that same article Mr. Sher quoted, 
the NRC is looking and thinking that even a 10 mile radius may be 
greater than necessary given what happened recently. The fact 
that people are sometimes better off in their homes with the 
doors and windowed closed. Are you able to go back to the NRC 
and say, we think this plan might work better in California? Do 
you have that kind of input into the emergency response plan? 
MR. SHIFFER: That was a very multiple kind of question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: It is a "yes" or "no" question. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let's go back and break them down one 
at a time. 
MR. SHIFFER: I can make some statements relating to 
your questions. There is one thing in the article that I do 
agree with, and that is many people in the past (not the 
emergency planners, but some people) believe the only effective 
response is evacuation. There is and have been in many cases a 
tendency for people to say a plan is not going to effective, 
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unworkable or whatever unless you immediate evacuate. Our plan 
have never been written in that manner. In other words, our 
plan always look at the relative consequences of sheltering 
versus evacuation. You have to make a detailed technical 
decision. Where is the plume. How much time do you have? What 
are the conditions? What is the likely strength of the plume? 
All those types of considerations are discussed in our 
procedures. Unified assessment centers and other involved 
agencies make thoughtful decisions as to whether evacuation is 
the appropriate response. If evacuation is the appropriate 
response, we would evacuate. We do not simply evaluate the 
entire emergency planning zone if it is not appropriate. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you have the authority to make 
those decisions? 
MR. SHIFFER: Absolutely. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: In other words, evacuation may or may 
not be implemented depending on whatever is decided. 
MR. SHIFFER: That's correct. In every exercise, 
evacuations have all been staged evacuations. We look at the 
direction of the presumed plume. We evacuate in stages. The 
people in close proximity would be evacuated first before we move 
to people further away from the plant. That is done in 
unction with our advisors and the people involved in the 
Sheriff's Department given the best flexibility to do so. 
40 
II 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Presently, do you have the 
flexibility? 
MR. SHIFFER: Absolutely. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What about SMUD? You have given the 
Committee this bulletin. How do you get this information to the 
people? 
MR. MYERS: This information is our means of meeting the 
annual requirements for providing information to the public 
within the 10 mile zone around Rancho Seco. Those two maps and 
calendar are means of providing information about the emergency 
plan to the public. Each of the residence within the 10 mile 
zone is mailed a packet of this information on an annual basis. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: This is a new occurrence thanks to 
Mr. Hauser. Wasn't that your requirement that this be mailed? 
Haven't you been doing that prior to the new law? 
MR. MYERS: We have been doing it either my mail or hand 
delivery. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Mr. Sher? 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: I assume this hearing was prompted by 
the recent incident in the Soviet Union. A lot of the witnesses 
might want to answer in response to a variety of incidences that 
can occur where the responses may be different. I'd like to talk 
about the kind of incident that occurred at Chernobyl in the 
Soviet Union recently that prompted these hearings. I assume if 
that is done, the appropriate response would involve an 
evacuation. Am I right on that assumption? 
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MR. SHIFFER: Certainly. 
MR. MYERS: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Given what you know about Chernobyl, 
and assuming you had an accident on the same scale, are your 
plans effective enough to evacuate those areas without death to 
anyone apart from the immediate explosion? We're told there is 
some doubt. Two person were killed from the immediate explosion 
at Chernobyl. If you had an accident of that magnitude, the 
record would be as good at your plants? Obviously, two persons 
is not a good record. 
MR. SHIFFER: To make your question a little fair, when 
you say a comparable accident, let's talk about a comparable 
release. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: You are going to tell me that it 
wou never happen at Diablo. 
MR. SHIFFER: Not a comparable accident, but let's say 
it is s for a comparable release. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: You're speaking of a fire of that 
? 
MR. SHIFFER: I am going to have to argue with you about 
the of that magnitude. In my mind, the answer is yes. I am 
go now for Diablo Canyon. You are asking an 
inc speculative question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: It use to be speculative until it 
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MR. SHIFFER: You are asking me to ask what comparable 
magnitude did it release. I can't tell you exactly what 
magnitude was the release. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: However, you do know it was a bad 
release? 
MR. SHIFFER: Right. 
ASSEHBLYMAN SHER: D.oes your plan contemplate responding 
to a release of that magnitude in a way that would protect 
against injury, death, and long term effect? 
MR. SHIFFER: Yes, it does. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Do you have confidence that it would 
be successful? 
MR. SHIFFER: Yes, I do. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Is that true with Rancho Seco? 
MR. MYERS: Yes. 
MR. NORTON: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Would you be prepared to underwrite 
the liability? Are you that confident? 
MR. SHIFFER: The utility do underwrite the bulk of the 
liability. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: I mean personally. Does your family 
live in that emergency area of these plants or do they live 
outside the 10 miles zone? 
MR. NORTON: I personally spend a lot of time at the 
facility. I take my wife and children frequently. I have stayed 
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many times in the San Luis Obispo and Pismo Beach areas, and have 
no fear whatsoever. 
MR. SHIFFER: I've lived there for 10 years. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: It wasn't working for 10 years. 
MR. SHIFFER: That's true. At the time I've lived 
there, it was expected Rancho Seco to be working. My job was to 
be there when it worked. 
ASSEMBLYMAN SHER: Did you move out when Diablo came on 
line? 
MR. SHIFFER: No, I did not. I moved out when my job 
required me to do so. 
MR. JACKLEY: I live in San Clemente for 10 years, which 
is 3 miles of the plant. My wife and family live there. My 
grandchildren come down and see me. Our plan is effective and 
would be very, very safe for the citizens. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: There were a couple of questions on 
what you perceive as the state's role relating to safety. Do you 
see any role for the state in terms of greater assurance for the 
people we represent? 
MR. NORTON: Our experience has been primarily with EOS; 
it has been a very positive experience. I would ask you to 
continue to fund them and make sure they have the right kinds of 
people to continue to do their job. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you see local governments having 
to pick up some of the expenses? Are there any joint 
partnerships with you? 
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MR. SHIFFER: Absolutely. We have funded substantial 
amounts of emergency equipment. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's on a voluntary basis. There 
is no mandate which requires you to expend any money on them. 
MR. MYERS: Madam Chairwoman, there is Senate Bill 1473 
that does provide for licensee reimbursement. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Is that measure presently in the 
Legislature or has it become law? 
MR. MYERS: It has passed through both Houses of the 
Legislature. There is a follow-up measure in the Legislature 
presently. I believe it is SB 1976. 
MR. SHIFFER: SB 1473 has been in effect since 1982. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Thank you. Are there any other 
questions from the Members of the Committee to the witnesses. If 
not, we thank you for your testimony. 
Our next witnesses will be Anne Vasquez and Sean Crowder 
representing state and local government • 
MS. ANNE VASQUEZ: Members of the Committee, I am Anne 
Vasquez from the State Office of Emergency Services. I am 
responsible on the state level for all radiological emergency 
programs. 
The Office of Emergency Services (OES) is responsible 
for several aspects of the preparedness in nuclear power. The 
first is planning. What she is passing out to you is the 
legislation that began the process. The concept of legislation 
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was due to an issue that came out in the question to the NRC, 
FEMA and the utilities. 
Senator Garamendi began the project upon which I work, 
and which funds both the state and local jurisdictions. He began 
the legislation in 1979. It was chaptered in 1979. It had a 
sunset clause. We continued the project in SB 1473. The sunset 
clause is the first day of 1988. Senator Bill Campbell has 
agreed to continue the project by carrying legislation for us in 
SB 1976. That bill appropriates funding for all the state and 
local costs. All the funds come though the State Controller's 
Office, and then administered by my office. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN CATHIE WRIGHT: You started in 1976? All 
you have been doing is advancing the sunset date. 
MR. VASQUEZ: Yes. We were in the Appropriations 
Committee the other day. If I remember correctly, we move the 
total sunset date; it became part of the budget process. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We got you funded. Now, tell us what 
you 
MR. VASQUEZ: The Office of Emergency Services (OES} is 
re ible for writing the state emergency response plan, 
coordinating the planning of other state agencies for nuclear 
, and assisting the local jurisdictions in their planning. 
As directed by Senate Bill 1183 in 1979, the state plan has been 
completely upgraded and accepted by Governor's Emergency Council 




Management Agency. Local plans have also been upgraded, 
reviewed, and accepted by OES formally, and submitted with the 
state plan for acceptable by FEMA. 
OES is also responsible for conducting and/or 
participating regularly in nuclear power training drills and 
exercises. Drills with all three California sites (Rancho Seco, 
Diablo Canyon and San Onofre) are conducted on a regularly 
scheduled basis as mandated by federal regulations. 
CHAIRWOHAN MOORE: Are those the biannual exercises? 
MR. VASQUEZ: Yes. Full scale exercises involving 
state, county, and city utility personnel are conducted in each 
site biannually. These exercises are reviewed and graded by FEMA 
(Federal Emergency management Agency) , DPA (Environmental 
Protection Agency) , DOE (Department of Energy) , NRC (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission), USA (U.S. Department of Agriculture), and 
other federal agencies. 
The way that work is FEMA as the coordinating agency 
brings together an evaluation team. 
stand behind us. They take notes. 
and review . 
These people come in and 
They develop their comments 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you feel that your office has 
adequate input into that process? 
MS. VASQUEZ: Yes, we do. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Do you have an opportunity to say you 
have changes? 
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MR. VASQUEZ: Very much so. In some cases, members of 
my staff (rather than participating in the exercise as a play) 
will participate as a reviewer as a part of the federal team. 
We're done that in Oregon at the Trojan Nuclear Powerplant. We 
have expertise from other states. In Arizona, we are planning on 
doing that as well. 
OES ensures that any weaknesses identified by the 
exercises are corrected. We do that through negotiations with 
both the federal members and the local jurisdictions. Since 
1979, there has been 11 full scale exercises in California. 
Federal critiques of these events have identified no significant 
flaws in emergency planning or response. 
OES also has responsibility for responding to a nuclear 
power emergency in California. OES would coordinate all state 
resources from its operations center here in Sacramento. 
Further, OES maintains a cadre of response team members who 
reports to local operation centers, and help assisting in an 
emergency, identifying appropriate public actions, and providing 
any other assistance requested by local jurisdictions. 
Nuclear power preparedness in California is an ongoing 
program. Local, state, utility and federal representatives work 
together daily to ensure the greatest protection of the public. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Why don't we hear from Amador County? 
MR. SEAN CROWDER: I'm Sean Crowder. I'm the 
Coordinator of Emergency Services for the County of Amador. I 
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paint somewhat a much less rosy picture of preparedness around 
the nuf'!lear powerplant as the former witnesses. It bears some 
explanation in hearing the testimony that the Committee should 
understand there are a number of plans. There is a FEMA plan, a 
state plan, a utility or on-site plan, as well as (at least in 
the case of Rancho Seco) three county plans which relates to the 
plant. 
I was intrigued by Mr. Sher's comment about can the 
state do something to actually assist with legislation to improve 
emergency preparedness. I believe the state can. 
There have been discussion to shrink the emergency zone 
from 10 miles down to 5. As a matter of fact, there have been 
discussion it should be expanded to 25 miles as oppose to the 10 
miles. I believe for the 10 miles emergency planning zone, 
planning at this point is adequate. However, if you look beyond 
the 10 miles, you will take into account the severity of the 
Russian incident which stemmed 18 miles. There should be some 
additional planning between 10 to 25 miles from a nuclear 
powerplant. The incident does not need to be of the same 
magnitude which occurs within the first 10 miles. However, there 
needs to be some additional planning done in that area. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: May I ask a question? 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Sure. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: On the point where you indicated 
it should go from 10 to 25 miles, would that be based on the 
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extent of the emergency? I wouldn't think you would want to go 
25 miles if it wasn't a dire emergency. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What he is saying you need to 
consider a 25 mile radius in case of an emergency. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I understand that. I'm asking 
him if he doesn't think it should be more or less a tier 
approach? 
MR. CROWDER: That's correct. That is what I'm saying; 
the tier approach. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Ms. Hughes? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: Do you really mean 15 miles from 
the 10 mile radius or do you mean 25 miles from the 10 mile 
radius? 
MR. CROWDER: I believe the existing planning which is 
done from the plant boundary to 10 miles is where the main 
planning should be done. In addition, an additional 15 miles, up 
to 25 miles, should be considered. 
I do not believe even within the 10 mile radius, 
planning is absolutely adequate for various reasons. The State 
of California should be given some type of enforcement authority 
concerning the plans and the utilities. For instance, my county 
has had substantial trouble in getting cooperation from the 
utility in correcting minor or not minor problems. We had a 
situation where we were unable to activate the sirens in Amador 
County due to an electrical failure. It took us two years to 
50 
finally get an auxiliary analyst established by Rancho Seco for 
our county. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I thought they were saying all these 
things had to be responded to within a 30-day period? 
MR. CROWDER: It has taken two years to correct this 
problem. It was corrected last month after my board of 
supervisors complained two years ago. We have some major 
inadequacies that still exists. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: What would the state reaction be to 
that? If you're coordinating those activities and they got a 
situation where they can't even notify the people with the 
sirens, is there any role you play in your coordination with the 
Office of Emergency Services? 
MR. VASQUEZ: There has been a few technical problems in 
that area. There has been a few delays on some of those items. 
I concur with that. We do go to the SMUD people and say, we want 
this corrected right away. They have had a history of being a 
little slow in responding; that has changed with their new 
management. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: You're saying it wouldn't take two 
years now to correct an emergency? 
MR. VASQUEZ:L Not in our experience with new 
management. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Obviously, you didn't have any 
authority to correct a deficiency in an expedite manner? 
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MR. VASQUEZ: Authority lies in licensing with the NRC. 
We go to the NRC with FEMA and say, we have to have this 
corrected. We keep at it and we keep pushing for it. As I say 
with the new management at SMUD, we do not see any further 
delays. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: I would think this would be 
considered an emergency if the emergency sirens do not operate at 
Rancho Seco during an nuclear incident. Did Amador County go to 
the state in term of receiving state assistance from FE~m and the 
NRC? 
MR. CROWDER: Yes, the state has assisted. The point I 
was making is the state really has no authority to compel the 
utility to correct the problem. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That's the point I was going to make. 
MR. VASQUEZ: The federal plan has been adopted by the 
state mandate that there must be a backup warning system if the 
siren fails, because you must anticipate minor technical 
fai s. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Obviously. 
MR. VASQUEZ: The responsibility to design the backup 
system is the responsibility of the county. Whenever a siren 
system is out, they accept it like any other emergency. They 
must be able to advise their citizens. Nuclear power is the only 




CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Obviously, that's true. If this is 
an integral part of the plan, I would have to assume they thought 
it was important when it was established. 
MR. VASQUEZ: We depend on the backup system until it is 
repaired. SMUD has corrected their lag period on that particular 
issue with their new management. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We are not trying to point fingers. 
We are trying to understand the role we have. This is not to be 
critical, but how do we go about getting system failures resolve 
quickly so we don't put the safety of the residences of the State 
of California in jeopardy? 
MR. CROWDER: My board of supervisors failed to approve 
the Rancho Seco plan as oppose to what Ms. Vasquez said. They 
may have been submitted. However, the board of supervisors has 
never approved that plan, because they have concerns in two basic 
areas. As oppose to what Mr. Nikas said earlier, there has been 
no substantial training around Rancho Seco at least for off-site 
authorities; that is a continuing concern of the board. We are 
in the process of correcting that, but presently it has not 
occurred . 
The other area is basically funding. The current 
legislation allows for $100 thousand per reactor to be given to 
the local agencies. That is inadequate; at least around Rancho 
Seco. It may be adequate elsewhere. My proposed budget for this 
coming fiscal year exceeds that $100 thousand by $30 thousand if 
it is approved by the state. 
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CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: There are no provisions for cost of 
living increases? 
MR. CROWDER: There is no legislative process for that. 
We do sit down and negotiate with the utility. They have been 
cooperative. However, there is no legislation to assure they 
will continue the funding for the off-site authorities. 
There are a couple of other comments that were made 
previously. I'm talking about the failure of the system. One of 
the things the state needs is enforcement authority in the 
notification process. I have with me just some brief notes that 
states just in the month of May, the primary notification system 
to Amador County has been down for 44 hours. Last month, it was 
down for 47 hours. In the month of June of 1984, it was out for 
43 days. This is a primary system. There are backup system which 
re upon basic land lines, and telephone lines. If an actual 
emergency occurs, there would be some substantial problems in 
actually communicating or coordinating the state, utility, and 
the other two counties. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Have you communicated this problem to 
the state? If you have, what was the reaction on correcting this 
matter? 
MR. CROWDER: I have been advised by the NRC to submit 
my documentation directly to them. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Under normal circumstances, he would 





MS. VASQUEZ: Yes. He brings it to our attention. The 
problem is technical in this particular type of alerting system. 
The local jurisdictions have asked for an alerting system which 
allows to communicate on the phone all at once. It is particular 
hard to keep those systems up and running; there has been 
technical problems. Again, the state has taken a lead in 
resolving this problem. We finally have a new management system 
at SMUD to resolve that problem . 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Could the emergency equipment or 
plans go unattended? Is the equipment out of order for extended 
periods of time? For example, you alluded to the sirens being 
inoperable for 43 days. 
MS. VASQUEZ: There is a backup notification system 
which is simply public telephones. We are 45 minutes from them. 
We can patch in to their Sheriff's Department with radio through 
the OES headquarter's radio net. 
We were told that backup equipment is not important. 
Now, we are hearing that the primary system appears not be 
important either. 
MS. VASQUEZ: The primary system is important, because 
it allows conference calling; that is why it was established. 
There has been problems with it. We won't deny that. The reason 
that it hasn't been a stop operation, the 
public-safety-is-threatened type of issue. The backup system was 
identified. In other words, we haven't said that is the only way 
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we have of telling them of what's going on. It is the main way 
we originally designed the plan. We ran into problem with it 
was separation of AT&T. To get a phone fixed was very 
hard 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We know; a lot of people feel that 
way. The phone company is really what we need to address at some 
point. What role is the state playing in trying to help 
coordinate these things and get them moving expeditiously? If 
that is a part of your safety planning, who has the ultimate 
authority? 
MS. VASQUEZ: We are work1ng on those issues, and have 
been working on the issues in the past. 
MR. CROWDER: If I can make a slight exception to Ms. 
Vasquez's' statement; one of the things that is of concern to my 
county if Rancho Seco is allowed to run a nuclear powerplant, why 
can't they operate a phone? We have not seen that happening. It 
ses questions on their capability to run a nuclear powerplant. 
I can document as far back as 1983 the same problems with the 
phone system. If the state had some enforcement, the Governor 
cou order a shut down of the plant until it is corrected. Some 
mechanism has to be available to correct those problems. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: A shutdown is not exactly one of t.he 
Governor's authority. We have the NRC. We have the authority to 





MR. CROWDER: FEMA also mentioned counties are required 
to participate in the emergency response plan exercise. It is my 
understanding the current law requires the counties to have their 
own plan. However, state law does not require the counties to 
bring their plan up to any specific standards other than 
obtaining state approval. There is no requirement that the 
county must demonstrate their plan in an actual exercise. If the 
County of Amador chose not to participate in an exercise, there 
is no federal or state law requiring them to do so. The training 
needs to be required by the state to ensure it is been 
implemented. 
To answer Ms. Molina's question on whether or not they 
actually receive a pass of fail on an exercise, there is no FEMA 
grading system. The counties have asked for a grading system. 
We do not see scores. You only receiving a pass or fail score. 
The county also has concerns about the information flow. 
FEMA and the NRC don't have any discussions directly with the 
counties on their concerns. It goes to the state for that 
communication. Direct communication between the federal 
authorities and the local authorities should be considered. It 
is the locals responsibility to provide that immediate response 
to any disaster. Waiting for the federal agencies for 12 hours 
for a response would probably be more like 24 hours. Thank you. 
MS. VASQUEZ: Mr. Crowder is incorrect. There are 
requirements for local jurisdictions to plan, exercise and drill. 
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There is simply circuitously found in the Emergency Service Act 
which validates the state's nuclear powerplant plan that directs 
al jurisdiction within a given zone's plan. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Does it provide any sanction for 
those we don't have a emergency response plan? 
MS. VASQUEZ: The sanctions aren't there, but we control 
the funds. So, we can simply not provide them funding. 
CHAIRW0~1AN MOORE: \Ale being whom? 
MS. VASQUEZ: The Office of Emergency Services cannot 
accept the budgets submitted by local jurisdictions if they do 
not use their money allocated for nuclear powerplant 
preparedness. That is what the money is earmarked for, and the 
money would simply be cut off. In that case, other resources 
would have to be used to respond to a nuclear emergency in that 
area. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: That would be even worst than no 
legislation at all. Let's hear from the County of 
Sacramento. Ms. Hopwood? 
MS. CAROL HOPWOOD: I'm Carol Hopwood. I'm Emergency 
Operations Coordinator for the County of Sacramento. The County 
of Sacramento, perhaps even more than the other tvm counties 
involved, has a very primary role since Rancho Seco is in our 
county. 
We also share some of the concerns of Mr. Crowder. His 
po is well taken that we have had some initial problems with 
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the two-digit ring down system. However, we are trying to 
address those issues right now wjth the Public Information Office 
Committee composed of SMUD, the counties and the state. We are 
looking at an alternative system to the system that currently 
exists. We are confident that we will be able to get a better 
system in the near future. 
Ms. Vasquez's point is also well taken. Since Mr. 
Lorell came on board (SMUD) as General Manager, we have found 
that they are willing to l~ten more to our complaints and 
concerns. 
With regard to the December 26th incident which took 
Rancho Seco down and has not allowed it to operate since that 
time, the counties have made it quite clear to SMUD we would very 
much oppose the plant operating if we are not able to strengthen 
the communications links between the control center at the plant 
and our outside communication centers. The County of Sacramento 
will go on record pubicly if we do not believe that appropriate 
training is done before the plant goes back into operation. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Have you done a response that 
training exists at Rancho Seco? 
MS. HOPWOOD: Yes, we have. There is an action plan 
they have put together. There has been some training with their 
control room operators, the operators at the plan, and our 
communications people. Unfortunately, those meetings also 
occurred during the time of the recent historical flood in 
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Sacramento. Mr. Baldwin, who is the coordinator from San Joaquin 
I could not attend. However, Mr. Crowder attended 
us for the counties. That training has been done. 
We insisted that more training be done, so that our 
communications people actually know who they are talking to on 
the other end of a telephone line. When you know who you are 
talking to, when you've seen that person, and when you have 
with that person on a one on one basis, it is easier 
to understand what the person on the other end of that telephone 
line is going through. That's our point. 
If Rancho Seco does come back on line under the new 
we ll have a much better relationship with that 
p Sacramento County believes it has a very comprehensive 
We have about 6,500 people in our emergency planning zone. 
We evacuate those people in a timely manner given any 
s 
worse case scenar 
panel needs to understand is that even in a 
(a core meltdown), there is still time. 
element of time. A nuclear powerplant does is s 
not melt to the bottom of the containment vessel in a matter of 
30 
conta 
You do have some time. 
What you also need to be aware of is, unlike the 
1 p 
s 
, Rancho Seco and all the American nuclear 
are commercial powerplants do have 
That is go1ng to make a difference in our favor 
to planners. 
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CHAIHWOMAN MOORE: We all understand that. Believe me, 
the utilities have made that point. 
MS. HOPWOOD: As long as SMUD has that plant up and 
running, our most important responsibility is the protection of 
our citizens. Sacramento County is acutely aware of that. Our 
plan works. We are confident it works. We test on a biannual 
exercise to make sure it works. However, there are some 
communication links that needs to be improved. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Ms. Hughes? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: When you say we have some time 
here in Sacramento, how much time are you talking about? 
MS. HOPWOOD: What we're talking about is a variety of 
variables. It depends upon the nature of the accident. If you 
are talking about a fire, I don't believe the kind of a fire that 
occurred at Chernobyl necessarily might occur in our plants. If 
it did, there would still be a containment building there. If we 
get to a point where they cannot cool the core and goes into a 
partial meltdown which happened at Three Mile Island, the 
containment vessel will do what it suppose to do. It would 
contained the radio activity. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: In a case of a fire similiar to 
Chernobyl, how long would the containment vessel hold the radio 
activity? 
MS. HOPWOOD: Is SMUD here? 
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~1R. DON MARTIN: name is Don Martin. I'm the 
Director of Publ Af I'm a Health Physicist by training. 
I Seco. I 1 worked on the 
emergency pl 
could not occur. 
reactor vessel 
To answer the quest , a f like that 
s not 
to 
ing material in the 
If there was a meltdown, I 
think would ta realm of two, three to four days before 
the meltdown containment. During time, of 
course, amounts of ll occur with that radio 
active material. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: If did happen by some flute, 
s to evacuate? we would have two 
MR. MARTIN: At t. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN HUGHES: Thank 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER We have concentrated on the three 
large commerc 
some 
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paid by the 
nuclear powerplants. 
1 emergency plans 
I 
in the state. Those are funded generally from the federal 
grants. The planning for responding to a fire or an emergency at 
one of the small research reactors is done at the local level and 
reviewed by my regional staff. 
The effects of an accident at those much smaller 
reactors is not something that would effect an entire city. 
Basically, what we do in those cases is make sure that the first 
response is to police and fire departments, and make sure they 
are trained to recognize and respond to a radiological accident. 
In many cases, the community or the business that owns that 
reactor pays for all the local responders to be training, and we 
review those plans. 
ASSEMBLY~~N HAUSER: However, not in every case. You 
said in many cases. 
MS. VASQUEZ: The problem is I can't list all of the 
reactors right off the top of my head. I am a little cautious. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HAUSER: We do have a commercial plant up 
north. What about Humboldt Bay? 
MS. VASQUEZ: Humboldt was listed in the original 
legislation, because at the time PG&E had not announced they were 
going to be decommissioned. They have now announced it is not 
going to be operating. The cores are stored on site. They are 
so old, a lot of of the immediate isotopes have gone through 
half-lifes. Those cores are stored in their ponds that are 
designed for that purpose, and will be there until some later 
date that PG&E gets permission to put them some place else. 
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I understand they are safe where they are. We checked 
with the Department of Health Services Radiological Health 
branch, and have a monitoring program making sure that store 
ponds are functioning. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: Let me thank you for your 
participation on this panel. I'm sure we would like some further 
dialogue to see if we can't work out some of the concerns that 
were raised by the counties. We look forward to working with you 
to correct those problems. There maybe something we can do 
legislatively to respond. For example, should we increase the 
money in the Campbell bill? Maybe that is one way we can help. 
There is an appropriation of $100 thousand in the Campbell bill. 
MR. CROWDER: Yes, it is $100 thousand. However, that 
is inadequate for Rancho Seco. Anne could probably addresses the 
adequacies of the other counties. It should be at least $300 
thousand or slightly more for Rancho Seco. 
CHAIRWOMAN MOORE: We will be discussing that with you 
as the bill moves through the Legislature. Again, the Members of 
the Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee thank you for your 
participation, and look forward to working with you in the next 
few months in this area. With that, this meeting is adjourned. 
* * * * * * * * 
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Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Committee: 
I am Dean M. Kunihiro, Regional State Liaison Officer 
Regulatory Commission's Region V Office in Walnut 
I am appearing before you today to provide you with brief 
regulations governing emergency preparedness at, and in the 
nuclear power facilities licensed by the Nuclear 
In August 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
order to assure that adequate protective measures could be 
of a radiological emergency at a licensed nuclear power 
these regulations are enclosed with my 
I would like to highlight some of the major 
emergency preparedness regulations. First, in the 
license authorizing only fuel loading and low power 
of the rated power), no NRC operating license for a 
will be issued unless the NRC finds that there 
adequate protective measures can and will be 
radiological emergency. The NRC bases its f 
to whether the applicant's onsite emergency 
is reasonable assurance that they can be 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
whether State and local governments' offsite emergency 
whether there is reasonable assurance that can be 
Secondly, the regulations extend emergency considerations 
"Emergency Planning Zones." One zone is related to direct 
and the other to exposure via the food chain. The exact size 
configuration of these zones surrounding a 
are determined by such conditions as demography, 
characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries 
• of the 
which identifies the 
meet. There are 
a wide range of 
• state and local 
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 
PRESENTATION TO THE UTILITIES AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE 
CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE 
APRIL 7, 1986 
Gwen Moore, ChalrwomJn 
Madam Chairwoman, Members of the Committee 
# 
My name is Robert W. Myers and I am employed with the Sacramento Municipal 
Utility District as the Supervisor of Emergency Preparedness. One of the 
major areas of my responsibility is to assure proper coordination of the 
District Emergency Response Plans with those of the counties of Amador, 
Sacramento, and San Joaquin and the State of California. 
As a result of issuance of regulations and regulatory guidance by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
particularly the guidance contained in Criteria for Preparation of Evaluation 
of Radiological Emergency Response Plan to Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG 0654 
FEMA REPl Rev. 1, published November 1980, the Sacramento Municipal Utility 
District has completely rewritten its Emergency Response Plan to conform with 
this regulatory guidance and to properly integrate response functions of the 
Sacramento Municipal Utility District with the response functions of the 
counties and state jurisdictions. Three major exercises have been completed 
with these jurisdictions. 
Major planning standards covered by the regulatory guidance and described in 
D the plans and implementing procedures include the following topic areas: 
Assignment of Responsibility 
Onsite Emergency Organization 
Emergency Response and Resources 
Emergency Classification System 
Notification, Methods, and Procedures 
Emergency Communications, 
Fublic Education and Information 
Emergency faci11ty and Equipment 
Acc1dent Assessment 
Protective Response 
Radlo1og1cal Exposure Control 
Med1cal and Public Health Support 
Recovery and Reentry Plann1ng in Post Accident Operations 
Exercises and Or1lls 
Rad,ological Emergency Response Training 
Respons1bil1ty for the Planning Effort 
Development. Per1odic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commiss1on and FEMA deliberately consolidated guidance 
1ntended for use by State and local governments and that 1ntended to gu1de the 
emergency planning and preparedness activities and NRC licensees because of a 
shared belief that an integrated approach to the develo~ment of response plans 
to radiological hazards 1s most likely to provide the best protection of the 
health and safety of the public. NRC and FEMA recognize that plans of 
licensees, State and local governments should not be developed in a vacuum or 
in isolation from one another. Should an accident occur, the public can be 
best protected when the response by all parties 1s fully integrated. Each 
party 1nvolved must have a clear understanding of what the overall level of 
preparedness must be and what role it will play 1n the event of a nuclear 
acc1dent. This understanding can be ach\eved best if there 1s an 1ntegrated 
development and evaluation of plans. There must also be an acceptance by 
part1es and a clear recogn1t1on of the respons\b1llty they share for 
safe-guard,ng pub11c health and safety. 
In the sp1r1t of fulf1111ng this paragraph excerpted from NUREG 0654. the 
Olstrlct and three count,es have had period1c plann,ng team meet1ngs for 
overall coord1nat1on of plans and procedures for response to an 1ncident at 
Rancho Seco. These plann\ng team meet1ngs have been held over the past 






Three major emergency response exerc\ses have been completed with these 
jurisdictions \n the past four years. A fourth major exercise \~scheduled 
for later this year. 
Based upon the comprehensive nature of the current plans and procedures which 
are \n place and have been trained, drilled and exercised; the Sacramento 
Municipal Ut\lity District feels that the public health and safety can be 





JAMES D. SHIFFER 
TO THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON 
UTILITIES AND COMMERCE 
MAY 7, 1986 
Page 1 
Good afternoon, r~adame Chairwoman and members of the Committee. I am James 
D. Shiffer, Vice-President - Nuclear Power Generation, Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company. I have with me Bruce Norton, a licensing attorney retained by PGandE; 
and Warren Fujimoto, a Supervising Engineer for PGandE who has general 
responsibilities for emergency planning. 
PG&E takes pride in our emergency planning effort and welcomes the 
1 opportunity to discuss emergency preparedness for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. 
PGandE and San Luis Obispo County have gone to great lengths to assure that 
sound emergency preparedness for the plant and the community is in place. 
Emergency planning for our Diablo Canyon Power Plant began in 1973. PGandE 
began a major program in 1979 to enhance and expand its emergency planning for 
the plant and the surrounding community. Tens of thousands of manhours were 
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spent improving all aspects of the plans. The County, cities, school districts, 
fire districts, state agencies and others have also developed extensive plans 
with detailed implementing procedures. The California State Disaster Council, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) have reviewed and accepted the plans. 
Since 1981, ten major drills and exercises have taken place thoroughly 
testing essentially all aspects of the plans. Annually, 500 people from 
government and PGandE participate in these drills and exercises. As many as 40, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
representatives have evaluated these tests. San Luis Obispo County, the State 
Office of Emergency Services, and PGandE have received superior evaluations. 
The plans are comprehensive yet flexible to respond to differing emergency 
situations including floods, earthquakes, and fires. The effectiveness of the 
emergency plans was demonstrated during the extensive Las Pilitas fire of 1985. 
San Luis Obispo County implemented its plans and procedures to coordinate 
response actions. Communication netvwrks, public information programs, and 
evacuation of residents were all tested with excellent results. 
Each year 800-900 local government employees are trained and retrained on 
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their specific implementing procedures. PGandE conducts annual training for 
about 500 plant and corporate employees. 
San Luis Obispo County and PGandE know training by itself is not enough. 
The community must have an adequate understanding of the plans in place. The 
County, with PGandE, has developed comprehensive community information and 
education programs. For instance, the County mails an emergency response 
planning booklet annually to residents and businesses of the community. The 
booklet contains basic information on community response, protective actions, 
family preparedness, radiation, and how to get further information. Twice a 
year the booklet is supplemented by newsletters to the community addressing 
• various emergency planning response topics . 
Residents are encouraged, through advertising programs, to read the booklet 
and keep it in a convenient location. 
PGandE has confidence in the plan and the individuals who carry it out. 
In the event of an emergency, the Diablo Canyon Control Room will notify San 
Luis Obispo County within 15 minutes of an emergency declaration. The State 
Office of Emergency Services and NRC will also be informed. These notifications 
are ensured by multiple communications systems including radios, dedicated 
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telephones, microwave systems, computer links, and pagers. PGandE has also 
provided automatic alarms in the State Office of Emergency Services Harning 
Center in Sacramento which indicate high radiation or initiation of emergency 
core cooling systems at the plant. 
Initial notification begins the activation of emergency facilities. State, 
County, and PG&E personnel report to their emergency locations. 
PGandE mans several emergency facilities at the plant, San Luis Obispo and 
San Francisco. At Diablo Canyon, personnel are dispatched to the Control Room 
and Technical Support Center, and have the responsibility of managing onsite 
recovery operations. 
PGandE establishes a corporate incident response center at our San Francisco 
headquarters. The center provides access to the Company's considerable 
technical and logistical resources. 
In San Luis Obispo, PGandE built a single purpose, 3.5 million dollar, 
emergency response facility to co-locate both San Luis Obispo County's Emergency 
Operations Center and PGandE's Emergency Operations Facility. This building is 
the focal point for coordinating onsite and offsite recovery actions by the 
County, the state, federal agencies and PGandE. 
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I report to the Emergency Operations Facility to serve as the Recovery 
Manager for PGandE. As Recovery Manager, I manage the Company•s overall onsite 
and offsite response activities. 
The Emergency Operations Facility provides PGandE and the County with direct 
access to detailed plant and radiological information. Information is jointiy 
• 
evaluated by all responsible organizations enabling prompt decisions and 
assuring timely actions are implemented. The actions that may be implemented 
range from keeping the community informed of the situation to evacuation. 
San Luis Obispo County and PGandE also establish a Unified Dose Assessment 
Center, at the Emergency Operations Facility, where weather and radiation data 
are monitored. Radiological monitoring teams consisting of County and PGandE 
• 
individuals are dispatched throughout San Luis Obispo County with appropriate 
radiation detection equipment. A computer system in the Unified Dose Assessment 
• 
Center provides projections and direct access to radiation monitors located 
throughout the County and inside the plant. This computer information is also 
directly available in Sacramento at the State Office of Emergency Services. 
If protective actions involving the public are required, early notification 
is given utilizing a network of 129 sirens distributed throughout the emergency 
Page 6 
planning zone. The sirens alert the public to tune to an emergency broadcast 
station. The Emergency Broadcast System is made up of radio and TV stations 
which will advise the public of appropriate actions to take. During 1985 and 
1986 the siren system has had a 99.5% availability due to a comprehensive 
maintenance and testing program. 
A joint Media Center has been established in San Luis Obispo near the 
Emergency Operations Facility. The Media Center is operated by San Luis Obispo 
County, state, federal, and PGandE representatives and assures reliable, 
consistent, and timely information is given to the public. 
This has been a brief overview of the emergency response plans for Diablo 
Canyon. As you know, additional state and federal resources will play a 
significant role in recovery operations. 
In closing I would like to assure this Committee that it is PGandE's policy 
to maintain the highest emergency preparedness standard. rle know emergency 
planning is dynamic and we will continue our efforts to assure that 




MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE 
Good afternoon. I am Ann Vasquez, Chief of Radiological Programs Division 
with the State Office of Emergency Services. The role of Office of Emergency 
Services in nuclear power preparedness is multi-faceted. 
In planning, OES is responsible for writing the state emergency response plan, 
coordinating the planning of other state agencies, and assisting local 
jurisdictions in their planning. As directed by Senate Bill 1183 (1979), the 
state plan has been completely upgraded, accepted by the Governor's Emergency 
Council in 1985, and is currently being reviewed by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. Local plans have also been upgraded, reviewed and accepted 
by OES, and were submitted with the state plan for acceptance by FEMA. 
OES is also responsible for conducting and/or participating regularly in 
nuclear power training, drills and exercises. Drills with all three 
California sites -- Rancho Seco, Diablo Canyon and San Onofre -- are conducted 
on a regularly scheduled basis, as mandated by federal regulations. 
Full-scale exercises involving state, county, city and utility personnel are 
conducted at each site biennially. These exercises are reviewed and graded by 
FEMA, EPA, DOE, NRC, USDA and other federal agencies. OES ensures that any 
weaknesses identified during these exercises are corrected. 
Since 1979, there have been }t full-scale exercises in California. Federal 
critiques of these events have identified no significant flaws in emergency 
planning or response. 
OES also has responsibility for responding to a nuclear power emergency. OES 
.would coordinate all state resources from its operations center here in 
Sacramento. Further, OES maintains a cadre of response team members who would 
report to local operations centers and help with assessing the emergency, 
identifying appropriate public protective actions, and providing any other 
assistance requested by local jurisdictions. 
Nuclear power preparedness in California is an ongoing program. Local, state, 
utility and federal representatives work together daily to ensure the greatest 
protection of the public. 
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OFFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT 
RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ~ 
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE 
OCTOBER 8, 1986 
EXERCISE SUMMARY 
The Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Preparedness 
fxercise was conducted on October 8, 1986. 
The onsite (utility) exercise participation was evaluated by the 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V. The on-
site evaluation findings will be reported separately by that 
agency. 
The offsite (state and local jurisdictions) exercise participation 
was evaluated by 28 representatives of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX. 
The offsite evaluation findings are the subject of this report. 
The objectives and the scenario for the exercise were developed 
through a committee of utility, federal, state and local govern-
ment representatives. Each of the Counties of Amador, Sacramento, 
and San Joaqu1n established unique and innovative objectives and 
scenario activities. All of the objectives, as established, were 
met • 
... There were no deficiencies noted by the evaluators. Areas for 
corrective action, detailed later in this report, were identified 
·by evaluators as: 1) a need to refine public notification pro-
cedures for more expedient activation of the Emergency Broadcast 
System; 2) update plans and procedures to incorporate more ela-
borate prescripted messages for release by the Emergency Broadcast 
System Stations; 3) update plans and procedures to incorporate 
::newly developed operations resulting from pre-exercise drills; 
and 4) to change the language used for public notification of 
·· shelter and evacuation to identify and relate to familiar land-
marks rather than mileage parameters (e.g., 2-, 5-, and/or 10-
mile emergency planning zone, etc.). The areas for improvement 
that were suggested by evaluators for consideration by the state 
and local offsite jurisdictions are detailed in the narrative por-
tion of this report. All of the findings are considered to be 
correctible through training activities and/or plan modification. 
It was generally agreed among the evaluators that offsite juris-
diction participation in the exercise reflected an above average 
performance. Many of the exercise participants are to be com-









plans and preparedness measures of the 
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ion IX, during an exercise conducted at 
s is a report of the findings that re-
ng that exercise. 
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ion IX, radiological emergency plans 
evaluation activities undertaken to 
ier in this report, the objectives 
were developed through the cooperative 
tives and provided in the final form 
District. The objectives and the scenario 
ear Regulatory Commission and the 
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objectives and the scenario for the onsite 
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established procedures, scheduled for 
Agency, Region IX, on July 25, 
ifornia Office of Emergency Services on 
ite participation was scheduled for 
on September 5, 1986. Jhe timeliness 
exercise objectives and scenario provide a 
on, review and coordination of findings 
and Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
and the State Dose Assessment Center 
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exercise participation and to serve as 
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se by th€ State Officials being trained 
Management Agency Contractor 
ings relative to the scenario were 
nagement Agency, Region IX, United 
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the scenario were made and the final 
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ng the exercise were observed by repre-
lear Regulatory Commission, 
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Exercis<: Detail, continued 2 
Regicm '· Evaluation findings relative to those activities will ben.:-
ported ) 'fUr'ately by that agency •. 
Due to the need for full activation of each of the emergency operations 
centers for the counties participating in this exercise to respond to 
a flooding emergency earlier this year, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency/Regional Assistance Committee, Region IX, accredited the offsite 
radiological emergency response agencies with recognition for actual di-
saster activation of the emergency response organization and operations 
and permitted simulation of certain physical activities previously planned 
for demonstration during this exercise. This included prepositioning of 
exercise participants and visual aids. No evaluators were assigned to 
observe exercise participation (effected for training purposes only) at 
the State Operations Center or the State Dose Assessment Center. 
The exercise was evaluated on the b.asis of a jurisdictional capability 
to implement current radiological emergency response plans and in 
accord with established Federal Em~rgency Management Agency policy, cri-
teria, and guidance. The exercise· evaluation criteria and process was 
presented and coordinated with all' exercise participants to provide an 
understanding of the process and the responsibility. A copy of the 
issued Guidance Memorandum EX-1, Remedial Exercises, dated July 15, 1985, 
is provided as Attachment C of this report to reflect the categories esta-
blished for exercise evaluation findings. · 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency/Regional Assistance Committee, 
. Region IX, evaluators were provided with background materials, exercise 
objectives/scenario summary, past findings data, various planning docu-
m~ntation, and other pertinent information in advance of the exercise. 
An evaluator orientation to the localized sites, plans, and procedures 
was conducted on October 6, 1986, by representatives from the State and 
Counties and the utility. A pre-exercise evaluator's meeting was con-
ducted on October 7, 1986 to address assignments, schedule, and post-
exercise activities. A site tour of the facilities, as assigned, was pro-
vided by onsite/offsite jurisdiction representatives. An evaluator roster 
is provided as Attach~ent D to this report. 
A timeline of emergency classification events is noted at Attachment E 
of this report. The disparity in time between the two Counties of 
Amador and San Joaquin in comparison to Sacramento County is directly 
attributable to the decision-making element for Sacramento County being 
located within the Emergency Operations Facility. The time :lapse in 
activating the alert and notification system is addressed in detail in 
both the narrative portion of this report and the findings matrix. 
Exercise evaluators participated in an exercise, Controller conducted, 
preliminary findings discussion immediately following the exercise at 
each facility location. This discussion was used to clarify any ques-
tionable activities observed and to present an overview of preliminary 
findings, if any. 
. . 
3 
m October 9, 1986 to discuss their 
sentation at the exercise de-
we presented to all exercise partici-
ing conducted at the Emergency Opera-
A formal press conference was held 
District's Auditorium on that same 
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a Commission, Region V, Federal Emer-
ion IX, State of California Office of [mer-
es of Amador and Sacramento presented pre-
responded to media questions. 
tions were reviewed and re-examined dur-
corrective actions were pending at 
no previous finding was noted as a defi-
esta.blished by the Federal Emergency 
· sdictions at this site have demon-
ly. A listing of the 35 exercise ob-
Memorandum PR-1 are provided as Attach-
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the list of objectives are still to be 
local offsite jurisdictions at this 
Summary portion of this report, no 
uators for this exercise. The 
appear in the Exercise Matrix por-
ise observations reported by evaluators 
ated to Federal Emergency Management 
are suggested as possible improvements 
ite jurisdictions as options. There 
response by state or local governments 
improvement areas. These items were dis-
individually and collectively, as noted 
are provided below by either facility 
Emergency Operations Center or Radio-
tions facility were observed by a 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Re-
ional Assistance Committee, Region IX, 
se participation within the emergency 
as in accord with plans and procedures 
ectives established for that facili-
ings conducted by the utility were 
ve ction recommendations and information 
ite jurisdictions expediently and effi-
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·:(! '""!> Exercise Detail, continued 4 
Offsite Emergency Operat _ _iC?n~, Ea~_ilit.Y_J-_i:LLs_0!2_ Area 
The County (Amador, Sacramento and San Joaquin} Liaison staffs were pre-
positioned for the purpose of this exercise.· However, all County liaison 
personnel were familiar with emergency response call up procedures that · 
are described in state and local offsite jurisdiction planning documents. 
All three county staffs displayed professional manners and attitude, 
appeared knowledgeable with plans and procedures, and were well trained. 
leadership and decision-making skills were strong and effective. Communi-
cations and relations among and between the counties were excellent. All 
actions taken were purposeful and resulted in coordination of emergency 
response activities. All recommendations were in accordance with the plan 
and, in the case of Amador and San Joaquin, were relayed to decision-makers 
I for concurrence. 
The area assigned to the liaisons adequately provides and supports ex-
tended operations. Status boards in this area included information for: 
offsite release, protective actio~s, situation, weather conditions, road 
conditions, and emergency facilities. These status boards were all effec-
tively implemented. The personnel designated as "runners" did an excellent 
job of -keeping current information posted. 
The adequacy of the emergency operations facility telecopier system be-
tween all offsite facilities and the ability of the telecopier (clerical 
functions) to disseminate all transmissions in a timely manner were 
successfully used and demonstrated. The County Liaison staffs success-
fully demonstrated their ability to establish and maintain appropriate 
communications links. .. 
County liaison participation in the limited discussions between decision-
makers to determine appropriate measures for controlled recovery and re-
entry demonstrated an ability to coordinate and consider appropriate actions. 
o The status board entries relating to classification change 
data should indicate the time declared by the utility and 
time notification is received by the County. 
Offsite Emergency Operations Facility Public Information liaison Area 
In essence, the public information effort was very good. The staff attitude 
was excellent in the face of some adverse working conditions and inadequate 
staff resources. The public information liaison representatives performed 
their job in a sincere, competent manner. They worked consistently as a 
team in a relatively efficient and effective mode of operation. 
The objectives for this area of activity were met. It is obvious that 
the physical presence of Amador and San Joaquin County public information 
liaison representatives in the emergency operations facility would expedite 
the production of emergency information for use by the media. Their presence 
could possibly enhance the chances that the information is accurate and 




onal work space and private space for conferencing 
ia son staffs ~1ouid also upgrade: the effi-
so, the impl'OVcment of the emergency operations 
would enhance the total emergency operations 
releases was fair to good. Accuracy and con-
good. On the whole, information can be im-
technical terms and amplification of what 
c. Most releases tended to be on the lean 
the reason behind the protective actions; i.e., 
sks, etc. 
nformation and the production of the news copy was 
Public instruction seemed to be hampered by attempts 
Emergency Broadcast System texts. The utility 
ses. The State and each of the Counties released 
ses was relptively smooth. Public information liai-
operations facility briefings. 
eases could be improved by dedicating 
per jurisdiction. 
liaison space is restrictive and encum-
iture. The round table in the 
was used to keep press releases. It is 
news releases be posted on the walls 
removed to ·provide more space to 
area. 
was prepositioned. It was well organized and 
tly operated. It had an adequately trained 
were frequent. Status of the emergency conditions 








for thhe media. The utility had f,, 
e to role p ay t e media. They did this in an 1· 
an adversarial role when addressing the briefers. 
on officers and technical briefers were superb. 
were outstanding. News releases were re-
were adequate maps and visual aids. 
circuit television and all news briefings 
k to the rumor control area. The utility 
even addressed their liability to persons 
losses as a result of the accident. They 
a the Price-Anderson.Act that requires 
tion was disseminated on the condition of 
actions were explained adequately and timely. 
ia coverage--two newspapers, three radio 
• 
• 
txercise Detail, continued 6 
stations and fr .• ,,. television s'1tions. The fo1lowing are areas :·ecom-
mended for in!pr·•l'/t.:lllC:nt. 
0 The uti1ity news releases should be less technical (see 
news release comments below). 
0 State and county news releases can be improved (see news 
release comments below). 
o The utility should be less dominant at news briefings. 
·The State should be more dominant at news briefings. 
0 If Amador and San Joaquin County refuse to be represented 
in person at the Emergency News Center, a speaker phone 
system should be installed at the Emergency News Center 
for conversations between the media and counties. 
0 Rumor control officials by ~their own admission should 
improve the quality of their responses. However, rumor 
control was the best this evaluator has observed at~ 
exercise. 
o Quality of the Emergency Broadcast System messages can be 
improved and clearer copies made available to the media. 
o News briefers should identify their county emergency 
declarations and:wl)at they mean. 
N~ws Releases 
1 Some examples of the technical language used in the utility news releases 
are: 
0 Release #1 states ..... degradation of plant safety systems ... 
It could perhaps simply identify an accident has occurred 
which could result in .•. 
0 Very few people would know what a ..... spent fuel assembly ••• " 
was or what a ..... whole body exposure at the site boundary ••• " 
means. 
o News Release #2. The average person would not know what was 
meant by 11 The Reactor 'tripped' at 7:50 this morning due to 
a reactor coolant pump vibration problem ... 
o News Release #4. Paragraph two says " ... major plant functions ... " 
Suggest using .. plant operations" instead. Paragraph three, 
..... small packing gland leaks ...... 
o News Release #6. Paragraph two states " ... indicating the 
likelihood of a release path from the decay heat removal 
system ... ". The term "whole body radiation exposure is also 
too technical. Reference to 11 Southern site boundary" should 
be better identified. · 
ise 1 ' 
0 
to the news relea e\ are as follows: 
have a location of r·r:lc~,tse, such as 
Operations Center or Liaison, etc. 
7 
System messages did not identify the 
ease -by county or facility or both. 
not state at the end of the release: 
II 
eases should identify whether they are being 
State office, emergency operations cen-
operations facility. 
1 out the complete title instead of 
news media may not identify with the 
news releases d"id not provide the county 
number nor did they recommend lis-
Emergency Broadcast System station. 
news release No. 3 does not give the time 
indicate what routes should be taken 
process. 
ease No. 3 does not give the evacua-
st System station messages should identify 
. The messages should identify how oeople 
car or transportation, and/or disabled, can 
The message should also include a tele-
people to call. Perhaps it should"refer 
on brochure distributed by the utility 
to travel to shelter or to identify the 
sewhere in this report, the use of landmark 
n 1 eu of mileage indicators would lend itself 
ing of areas to be sheltered or evacua-
action reflected in the Findings Matrix of 




Exn·r:ise Detail, continued 
, .. ,:;1tion vii• ' :; Emergency Broadcast System. They included: 
',dcramentu County should update their plan to correct 
the telephone number used for contact to KFBK for 
placing them on standby. KFBK has four rotating tele-
phone lines. During an actual emergency, there is a 
strong possibility that all of these lines could be in 
use. Emergency response plans should address this pro-
blem by instructing the user to call the station and if 
a busy signal results to attempt to redial -- if the 
second attempt fails, there should be an automatic direc-
tion to use the Remote Pickup Unit (RPU) (radio) to con-
tact the radio station. Further, even if the user does 
make contact on the initial standby call to the radio 
station, they should inform the radio station to activate 
or ensure the operability of the RPU in the event it has 
to be used in lieu of the telephone. At the very least, 
the plan should address use of the remote pickup unit for 
advising the station to free a telephone line for contact. 
8 
° Controlled use of the Emergency Broadcast System Station 
KFBK should be addr.essed by the Sacramento County staff. 
There should be;a sjngle source of information provided to 
the radio stad~n f'or"~t~nsistency with news releases and 
.J>· activities emanating from the emergency operations facility 
and the county emergency operations centers. At the present 
time, the cities within Sacramento County can contact the 
radio station directly to release information. The County 
of Sacramento needs to arrive at some sort of an agreement 
with these jurisdictions that all news releases through the 
Emergency Broadcast System station will be funneled through 
the County in order to ensure that the public is not con-
fused by conflicting statements released through the radio 
station. 
Transportation 
Each of the County Radiological Emergency Response Plans address air 
traffic restrictions in the emergency planning zones in the event of 
a radiological emergency at the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. 
However, this element of the plans has not been demonstrated during an 
exercise. 
0 It is suggested that consideration be given to demon-
strating a capability to restrict air traffic in the 
emergency planning zone during a radiological emer-




pla1ming zone of the 
given to including the 
on ra lroad traffic that is provided 
in the emergency planning zone during 
at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating 
capability for restricting 
demonstrated at the same time the 
on is demonstrated. 
9 
third level County officials to effect 
during the exercise. The Amador County 
ly familiar with plans and procedures. 
individual staff was limited and a bit 
ad~quate. Security was enforced. Backup 
o Emergency Services were in place even 
of the service chiefs had clerks that 
ons. The service chiefs were continually an-
ty and were prepared to take precautionary 
County used second and third level players, 
they were well trained. 
assigned,provided briefings to the 
and at regular intervals, including 
:clarification. It appeared as if the in-
1 as there was no interaction on these 
the Service Chiefs. 
Services Coordinator 
of the service chiefs 
improved interaction. 
operating procedure (agenda) 
p. Service chiefs should be 
ons if they do not understand the 
in the technical area. 
all times for the action implemented. 
that these actions were ever completed. 
showed on four separate occasions that 
This information was being 
Center forms. The information was 
planning zone was to be evacuated. 
have corrected this error. 
boards include completion in-
when advice is received 
s did an outstanding job. Datafax traffic was 
1 i and numbering system is too confusing. 
• 
~xercise Detail, continued 10 
The message form for th~ emergen~y operations center needs to be revised. 
If there are two 1dions on one form, such as for radio and facsJ,!Ji IP., 
there is inadequd Li.' space to post the time sent and/or received. f111·· 
proved identification is needed by players initiating messages. Ti11~y were 
simply showing the·county name instead of County/EOC or County/FCP, etc. 
0 Suggest attention be given to improving the entire 
message center operations for more simplified system 
and improved identification. 
The runners in charge of duplicating and distribution performed in an 
exceptional manner. Amador County could use a copier that collates the 
material being duplicated. There was some mechanical difficulty with the· 
equipment, but it was repaired·within a short time. 
A disproportionate amount of the Emergency Services Director's time was ··~: 
consumed in monitoring the Unified Dose Assessment Center briefings and t 1 
filling out·the briefing forms of the Unified Dose Assessment Center and 
the utility emergency operations facility. In addition, some of the tech-
nical information presented at the Unified Dose Assessment Center briefings 
was difficult for the decision-making staff to digest and interpret. 
o A staff person with technical training on radiological 
health, such as the Radiological Officer, should assist 
the decision-making staff with monitoring the information 
coming from the Unified Dose Assessment Center. 
The County's media briefing room would not be adequate to accommodate the 
lq,rge number of reporters that could be expected in the event of an emer-
gency at Rancho Seco. The briefing room could accommodate about 50 people. 
o . The County of Amador should designate a larger facility as 
. the primary or backup media facility. 
There were four media briefings conducted. The Public Information Officer 
provided information as to the status of the situation within Amador County 
only. He referred the media to the news releases posted for Sacramento, 
. San Joaquin and the utility. He also gave them the address an.d the tele-
phone number for the emergency news center. The Public Information Officer 
did not seem able to handle the questions from the media, but did tell them 
he would get the information. At the close of the exercise, the media let 
the Public Information Officer know that during an actual emergency, this 
procedure would be unacceptable. The Public Information Officer was well 
informed in the use of plans and procedures and familiar with both. 
0 It is suggested that the Public Information Officer be 
further trained in methods to employ for obtaining in-
formation in a more expedient manner prior to briefing 
the media. 
Amador County partially met the objective to demonstrate the ability to 
establish traffic control and properly use survey meters {COV 700). Two 
11 
u )'; ng the ex ere i se, one of 
simulated. control 
ghway Patrol was located at 
lone Michigan Bar Road to prevent the 
affected emergency planning zone (2-
control point was familiar with his 
was trained in traffic control. He was 
imeter, plus a CDV 700 survey meter. 
imetry use nor in how to properly use 
aware the maximum a lowable dose 
to record dosimetry readings 
nation was ired. The 
ia Highway cer in 
.) were not delivered the con-
Adequate numbers of personnel 
various points are 
ifornia Highway Officer at 
eivi updated information a radio 
was not maintaining a log of 
The plan specifies that each 
wi two persons; one a uniformed 
ia Highway Patrol icer at the 
























Exerci ~Detail, cont~nued 12 
The functioning of tf,, ')Jcramento e111ergency operations center staff (both 
operational and suppor~-~ng) under the leadership of the assigned CoonJi-
nator, was outstanding. Most commendable was the effort to "cross-train" 
new and older members of the staff. Everyone used the .Plan as the ba ';is 
for their actions. Coordination was consistent throughout th~ 
exercise. 
Particular praise is directed to the activities of the four clerical staff 
assigned to message flow management, duplication and delivery. That messages 
reached the right places is directly due to their diligent efforts. A new 
telecopier system is sorely needed. One individual, by modest estimate, 
devoted 65% of the time rewriting blurred messages or making others legible. 
In Sacramento County, manning of traffic control points was simulated due 
to an agreement between the County and the California Highway P~trol. 
Barricades were delivered to all locations within the 2-mile emergency 
planning zone by County Public Works personnel. Traffic control functions 
for Sacramento County are the responsibility of the County Sheriff's De-
partment and the California Highway Patrol. ·The County Sheriff's Depart-
ment would man the control points initially until the California Highway 
Patrol personnel could dispatch to the sites. Traffic control is directed 
from the Field Command Post in Wilton. During the exercise the County was 
to have staffed one t~affic control point for demonstration ourooses. This 
did not occur. Emergency Personnel from the County Department of Public 
Works were dispatched to the field to deliver traffic barricades to tne 
preselected control points in the 2-mile emergency planning zone. The 
personnel were very familiar .with the area of their assigned responsibility 
and were knowledgeable~ir;tr~t'leir respective duties. Traffic control point 
locations were accurately a'nf(Juickly found and required equipment was 
distributed as appropriate. Personnel from the Department of Public Works 
were not adequately trained in the proper use of dosimetry. They were 
outfitted with a low range and high range self reading pocket dosimeter 
but were unfamiliar with significance of readings, proper recording pro-
cedures, who to notify in the event of an excessive exposure, and where 
to go for decontamination if needed. 
0 Improved training systems need to be implemented for 
these assigned emergency workers. 
San Joaquin County Emergency Operations Center 
The County received the initial notification in their 24-hour communications 
center. After the emergency operations center became operational, there-
ceipt of utility notifications was transferred to the emergency operations 
center. A communicator continuously manned the emergency phones. When the 
Technical Support Center transmitted notifications, this communicator trans-
cribed the information into the proper form. 
The County emergency operations center was activated with most staff being 
prepositioned (no actual callout). The emergency operations center \'las 
<?.Perational at 8:15a.m. and fully staffed by 8:3·J a.m. · 
13 
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facili~y has been r·eccntly modified 
tion in ~he current county plan. 
are plans to relocate the emergency opera-
the County Courthouse building. When 
an should be revised to reflect the 
was ess space than specified in the plan, 
demonstrated. There were status boards 
were maintained . by a staff of dedicated 
number of phones and a technician 
if any, would be corrected in a 
s several radio systems available to 
ition, commercial phone and dedi-
Two facsimile machines were also 
hard copy messages. 
ve action decisions after listen-
briefings, discussing options and 
service chiefs and finally coordi-
county decision·makers. 
staff did an outstanding job in coordi-
1 service chiefs were involved in 
emergency response. There was ex-
needs as the scena o events unfolded. 
te to 10 miles, the staff did an 
ing potential evacuees, setting 
needed transportation in the 
re ac ons beyond the 10-mile 
ons was coordinated among the 
sirens and wording of the 
were coordinated. However, the 
public was not in accordance with 
x of this report). 
tted to Emer-
inquiries, however, no media 
scenario rumor control calls in an out-
icated staff responded to in-
tion was i to respond to 
tro1 s ff reques i rmation from 
accurately respond to incoming calls. 
. ' 
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Exercise Detail __ , co·dinued 
0 In the initial phase of the rxorcise, the internal message 
flow in the emergency operations center experienced opera-
tional problems. Copies of messages were not distributed 
to all appropriate officials in a timely manner. It is 
suggested that increased training be implemented to improve 
this area of the response operations. 
o Not all news releases were posted as called for in the 
plan. The San Joaquin news releases were approv~d by 
the emergency operations center coordinator before re-
lease and were eventually posted. News releases received 
from other jurisdictions were not posted. Again, in-
creased training of staff assigned to this area to assure 
that all news releases (including other jurisdictions) are 
posted in a timely manner should be implemented. 
i4 
San Joaquin County demonstrated an excellent ability to control access 
to and evacuate designated areas. When questioned by the evaluator, the 
school officials did not know the exact number of children that boarded 
the buses, though they did assure the evaluator that each bus had a list 
of the children on board and each child did have an emergency card. 
The San Joaquin County Field Command Post staff outside the command 
vehicle were unaware of the situation at the plant as no status boards 
were used or posted. As.late as 12:30 p.m. no briefings had been held. 
Officers manning the F,te14iCo,mmand Post heard various events being re-
pO"rted over the radio, but no 'logs· were being maintained. Equipment 
(CDV 700) issued to the California Highway Patrol and San Joaquin Sheriff's 
personnel assigned to traffic control points were literally unused. The 
staff were not informed of equipment use, not trained, and did not know 
how to call in readings. 
0 Improved training systems need to be implemented for 
these assigned emergency workers. 
·There were so many individuals within the San Joaquin County Emergency 
Operations Center that performed their tasks in an exceedingly above 
average manner -- from the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors to the 
maintenance workers who kept the pathways clear and the coffee hot --
it would be difficult to do justice here. However, the Emergency Ser-
vices Coordinator and his immediate staff are especially noted for their 
attention to preparations and operations for this exercise. The San 
Joaquin County play included a great many exercise activities that were 
not a part of the scenario, such as the representatives from the Pacific 
Gas and Electric Company, Pacific Bell, and a local meteorologist, who 
were all provided with unique problem-solving messages throughout the 
exercise. The Amateur Radio Emergency Services were also provided an 




ified Dose Assessment Center were all de-
manner. The center was activated in a ti~ely 
dose calculations and assessment was 
Technical Support Center to the Unified Dose 
established for the center, other objectives 
tions facility apply to the center, since 
oper~tions facility. These objectives, 
t, status board posting, in~ernal ommunica-
rna1 con-:munications \·lith the techniccl support 
d monitoring teams, and fi::1d com:;~?.nd :;osv,, 
an excellent manner. 
es were demonstrated during the center 
r Service and Air Resources b0ard 
ing their means of 1·e::ric.'inj ob:=:l-va-
and satellite pictures using r~~oLe 
lite receiving recorders. The weather 
nting out specific meteorologic3l para-
affected by the areas real terrain. 
field radiation monitoring tearr.s capa-
tives such as perform air sampling was 
all teams since they were not re-
1 teams demonstrated their procedures 
detection instruments. 
corrective action items dete1·mi nee. The 
improvement which might receive action such 
ementation of training programs; review and 
if necessal·y; and emphasize radiation monitor-ins 
suggestions are general and they may not 
jurisdiction; thus, the reader will have to 
for the Unified Dose Assessment Center 
tective Action Recommendations v1ere im-
tl·teen the infonnation on the t(a.ns-
.. 




Exercise Detai.l, continued · 
the meteorologist participate in ':1 ic:fings to discuss the 
historic or specific probability ,,• any wind shifts that 
could affect sheltering or evacuation decision-making. 
16. 
o There is a continuing need for the field radiological moni-
toring teams to obtain initial training and subsequent re-
fresher courses or participate in regularly scheduled drills. 
Several items related to training or familiarity arose 
during the exercise, such as: 
-The inventory list for the radiation monitoring 
kits used-by the Sacramento teams did not contain 
check sources. It is; recommended that check 
sources be available. In addition the batteries 
in a flashlight and a dosimeter charger were weak. 
- Potassium Iodide (KI) is available for emergency 
workers, but the curre~t procedures should be re-
viewed to address that option. It is suggested 
that the KI should be available in the monitoring 
kits. It may not be possible or desirable to have 
a monitoring team return to the field command 
post and "runners 11 would not be recommended. 
- Techniques for use and interpretation of survey 
instruments can only be learned by hands-on-experience. 
Also, it is .recommended using meter face drawings to 
indicate scenario meter readings rather than reporting 
a controller supplied number. Constant attention and 
understanding of the radiation units of measurement 
must be practiced (millirem per hour vs. microrem per 
hour). 
- To conserve radio time, the data recording form could 
be used for a radio reporting format. This application 
will usually prevent having to repeat data or sub-
sequently having to verify data. 
- Special vehicles are usually required for travel on 
unimproved roads during the area•s rainy season. 
If 4 x 4 vehicles are not routinely available, a re-
source should be developed to provide them when re-
quired. 
-The procedure for air sampling was followed; however, 
the procedures ·do not specify a sample volume, or flow-
rate and sampling time. A three minute sample at 1.5. 
cubic feet per minute would probably not provide the 
required sensitivity. The following is offered: 
a) Determine the minimum sample volume necessary 
to provide an iodine sensitivity of 1 X 101 uCi/cc 
using the PRM-6 and HP-260 probe. 
lA?. 
zeolite cartridge with cle;n 
the cartridge. 
ng geometry (cartridge to 
to provide consistent sample 
ices could be purchased or de-
ish this. 
17 
in a controlled area may be beneficial 
tion of personal clothing. But the 
must be followed in undressing. Removing 
covers defeats the original purpose. 
members should be provided some 
training to be able to understand 
ant parameters (such as stack monitor 
by the field command posts. · 
r~adings should be incorporated 
so that the emergency worker control 
evaluated. This could be accomplished 
need to be provided in the monitoring 
d command posts. 
for this activity be reviewed and 
d have been distributed to 
monitoring team (consideration 
monitoring kits). 
na on. The awareness of need 
dent. However, this was not a 
is exercise. 
instruments) is not present at all 
of personnel and vehicles 
area should be routine. 
this need are to be identified. 
County was set up and fully activated at 









Exercise Deta i 1 , 
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operation bci}~ir:r:n 
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dor emergency 
hours, requi ri 
utility news 
18 
lent direction and cortrol from 
a 11 exercise objectives. Co-
t agencies was excellent. 
communication from the Ama-
center. Delays were one to three 
obtained from the 
0 It was noted t all personnel training in personal 
dosimeter use radia on safety. It was also noted that 
the Field Command Po has no emergency power. 
o No alternate fi d command post site is listed in the 
County's plan. To avoid confusion at an alternate site, 
it is recommended t a number preselected. 
The Incident Comma 
command post are 
and plan implementa on. 
gency re~ponse manual 
demonstration. 
Sacramento Field Command Post 
Overall operation 
good. Registration 
efficient and in ace 
valved at the field 
facility is large and sui 
communications were exc 
of the equipment and i 
sufficient in number; e.g. 
Patrol shared a si e line 
radiological moni 
coordinatiom1and 
well informed as 
personnel frequently as 
briefings became less 
reporting positive rad a 
needed the more 
but these could be u 
could be used to 
traffic control points. 
California Highway 
Area isolation (secu 
decontamination was 
of the exercise. 
of the Amador County field 
r professionalism, plan knowledge, 
training and the synopsized emer-
greatly assisted in this response 
d Command Post was very 
issuance of dosimetry were 
number of personnel in-
ate for the tasks and the 
emergency operations. Radio 
lity, quantity, and organization 
landlines (telephones} were in-
rtment and California Highway 
te for the traffic. The 
is tasks of field monitoring 
tively. He kept the teams 
so briefed the field command post 
tus of the exercise. (These 
release started and teams began 
s, when the field command personnel 
S tus boards were used effectively, 
a metal-backed board and magnets 
monitoring teams, emergency units, 
d. The Sheriff's Department and 
their tasks efficiently. 
were very good. Emergency worker 
is was not a specific objective 
19 
in County Field Command Post was 
ems were anticipated and possible solu-
ion was great. 
informed of the accident 
eld command post had not 
1982. 
command post needed training 
ogical instruments and 
people an~ equipment. 
rse to keep emergency workers 
assification or what was 
post is outside the 10-mile 
imetry was issued to the 
e were not issued dosi-
ided to persons 
e or vehicles. 
lt with first. An ex-
a heart attack victim was 
the medical emergency. 
considered the exercise and the 
workers at the various facilities 
most impressive aspect was the 
in the exercise and a general attitude 
public health and safety rather than an 
ing observed and evaluated. 
ffs constant activity with training 
.personnel as well as lars con-
hnical capabi1ity. 
were very professional. They. were 
t and were familiar with the area. The 
i y manner ~nd data were transmitted 
little error. 
were very good. They were familiar 
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The Sdn Joaquin mon i:. , 1 11q 
knowledge of the arc: 1 , ' 
<~ ,!l :1 .Lr'nted good knowledge of pruccdul'e'::, 
dosimetry. 
The overall operation of the Sacramento Field Command Post was very good. 
Management of the San Joaquin Field Command Post was excellent. The manager 
coordinated decision with his key staff and the staff worked very well as a 
team.· 
Amador's Field Command Post staff are to be commended for their professionalism,. 
plan knowledge and plan implementation activities during the exercise. 
The corrective actions that follow in the Findings Matrix are not meant to 
detract from the overall outstanding performance of the entire emergency re-
sponse operations demonstrated. They are considered to be what the Regional 
Assistance Committee believe preparedness exercises are conducted to provide-~ 








, the exercise findings and processing 
11 be in accord with Guidance Memoran-
Federal Emergency Management Agency/ 
of Understanding. The Exercise 
s determined as requiring corrective ac-
red, the areas cited are not considered 
public health and safety. 
ve actions, as contained in previous 
nated from this report on the basis of 
on that the findings are stated in suf- ·· 
, state, and local offsite jurisdictions 
ac ons. Federal Emergency Management 
Committee technical assistance will be 
is provided to the exercise par-
report. The responsible jurisdic-
days by completing the corrective 
trix. The final Exercise Evalua-
to the United Nuclear Regu-
exercise. With n 15 days of receipt 
ear Regulatory Commission will notify 
in writing of action taken with the 
State and local to 
were no deficiency findings to require 
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EXERCISE FINDINGS MATRIX 
EVALUATOR($) FINDING 
1. Two major general population protective action 
decisions were made during the exercise. The · 
appropriate decision-makers from Amador, Sacra-
mento, and San Joaquin Counties participated in 
both decisions. The decisions were based on plant 
''status and the recommendations of the Unified Dose 
Assessment Center and the utility. In both cases, 
the protective actions were precautionary and were 
not based on actual doses or dose rates. The 
plant status was such that there was a potential 
for a major release of activity with resultant 
doses above the protective action guides. The 
decision-makers appropriately decided to take 
precautionary protective actions prior to the 
actual release of significant amounts of radio-
active materials. The decision-makers decided on 
what protective actions were to be implemented 
and then allowed staff to come to agreement on 
the wording of the Emergency Broadcast System 
messages to be released to the public. The 
protective action decisions were not clearly 
described by the prescripted Emergency Broadcast 
System messages. They required lengthy discussion 
to coordinate the information to be included in 
the message. 
The staff worked in a businesslike and pro-. 
fessional manner during the coordination activity. 
It is vital to have Emergency Broadcast System 
stations release the same information to the 





E. 5 & 6 
App. 3 
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION/DATE 
/ 
Amador County: It seems to the county that this 
finding is merely a matter of someone•s interpre~ 
tation of federal guidance. We believe the 
Counties of Amador, Sacramento, and s,::·' ___ ,,in 
fully met the Nureg gui~ance criteria & 6, 
ref. App. 3 in relationship to meeting e 15 
minute guidance criteria. A coordina decision 
to alert the public-was made and an appropriate 
response action was agreed upon and actually imple-
mented within the 15 minutes. That implementation 
decision specifically included not taking action 
until the-EBS messages were completed to our co.11ec•-
tive satisfaction and that required an additional 
five minutes. We believe that an alerting decision 
was made and implemented within the 15 minute 
guidance requirement. We further believe that had 
a decision been made to implement any given a1 
ing action, let's say two hours later, we would 
still have met the fifteen minute guidance cri-
teria. Therefore, Amador County rejects this 
finding. 
Sacramento County: Sacramento County believes that 
the 15 minute requirement should be based on those 
conditions that exist at the time of the message. 
Protective actions that were ordered were pre-
cautionary and ·were based on potential e~sures · 
rather than actual exposures. The pub'; ld 
not have received any additional expo : e f r·~rn the 
time interval in excess of the 15 minute require-
ment. Sacramento Coun would like to remind FEMA 
a P IO D ri 11 was on 10, 
1986, during which the 15 minute requirement was 
met. However, we realize that the current EBS 
messaQes ar 
.11 !D. T.~n T f'Tlrl,tllf·!N.QJ;,OD .. I= ArT I TTV 
'v 




time elapsed between 
protective actions by the 
was in excess of the 15-minute 
No additional public exposure would have resulted 
from the time interval in excess of the 15-minute 
requirement used to modify the Emergency Broadcast 
System message. Again, both protective actions 
were precautionary and were based on potential 
exposures rather than actual exposures. 
[NOTE: It was suggested to the state and local 
offsite jurisdictions during the debriefing that 
~n alert and notification system drill, to in-
clude simulation of siren activation and dissemi-
nation of Emergency Broadcast System messages, 
be conducted in the early spring of 1987. The 
determination to categorize this finding as a 
corrective action was based on the successful 
demonstration for meeting the 15-minute timeline 
during the Public Information Drill conducted 
on July 9, 1986. This was confirmed with the 
Headquarters and the NRC, Region V.] 
oasi rea 1 
ways act in a manner 
most tive ion 
and not according to artificial time limits. 
County will not in the future discuss the 
meet that 11 0bjective." 
[Note: The State did not comment on this cor-
rective action item.] 
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EXERCISE FINDINGS MATRIX 
EVALUATOR(S) FINDING 
2. The content of Emergency Broadcast System 
messages prepared for dissemination to the public 
was inadequate. Firstly, as noted above, the 
messages required extensive modification for re-
leasing information of the type required to fit 
' 
1 the particular situation (precautionary measures). 
Either a series of prescripted messages, 
addressing every conceivable situation that is 
known to be able to arise as a result of a radio-
logical emergency at the Rancho Seco;Nuclear 
Generating Station should be developed or a more 
efficient form to be completed by radio station 
engineers. Secondly, the messages did not in-
clude evacuation routes or locations (addresses) 
of reception centers. Thirdly, protective action 
areas were not described in terms of familiar 
landmarks and boundaries. Instead, the public 
was instructed to take protective actions if 
located within 2-, 5-, or 10-miles of the plant. 
Residents and transients within these areas may 
not be aware of their distance from the plant 
site and therefore would not know whether they 




PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION/L~-~ 
Amador: The County of Amador agrees in concept 
with this finding. We realize that the EBS :>?s-, 
sages are inadequate in many senses, and th e:r re 
intend to coordinate the rewrite of all EBS s-
sages with the other two counties. We believe thi 
action should be completed by June 30, 1987. 
The County of Amador disagrees with portions of 
this finding which assert public protection areas 
should be 11 described in terms of familiar land...: 
marks and 6oundaries ... Since we disagree with 
this stated interpretation, we will work closely 
with FEMA officials during our EBS rewrite acti-
vities to assure that our messages meet the letter', 
and the intent of the guidance. · 
Sacramento: The three County Coordinators will mee 
after the first of the year (January 1987) to re-
write the prescripted EBS Messages. Appropriate 
evacuation routes and familiar landmarks and boun-
daries will ·be reviewed and if deemed appropriate 
will be included in our messages. In addition, 
the evaluator's findings indicate that we did not 
include the addresses of our Reception Centers. 
This is an incorrect finding. The Sacramento,. 
County emergency messages did include the addre 
of both Reception Centers located in Sacramento 
County as well as those in Amador County. 
San Joaquin: It is agreed that the EBS messages 
could be improved. A re-evaluation of the mes-
sages will take place in January along with a re-
evaluation of the Public Protection Areas . 




1 . rst 
received directly at 
center was at 12:35 p.m. In addition, the 
ifications received at the Sheriff's Dispatch 
were not relayed promptly to the emer-
operations center. As a result, the emer-
operations center staff had to rely on 
ial notifications from the Amador Liaison 
emergency operations facility or await 
verifications which also were considera-
ayed. 
, 1 
employee termination, as well as ex 
training programs, ready addressed th1s 
identified deficiency. 
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EVALUATOR($) FINDING NUREG REF. 
1. Actual message center procedures at the I N.l.a. 
Sacramento County Emergency Operations Center 
did not follow the most recent written procedures 
(issued January 20, 1984). Actual operating 
procedures, which worked quite well during the 
exercise, directed message center operators to 
relay calls requesting actions requiring imple-
mentation by functional service chiefs to those 
individuals, even if they were not identified by 
name by the caller. These new procedures were 
established based upon experience gained during 
a recent flooding emergency and difficulties 
experienced during a recent practice drill for 
a nuclear pmver plant emergency. Existing 
written procedures only call for the relaying of 
calls to service function chiefs if they are 
identified by name by the caller, with·other 
action requests requiring a written message to be 
developed by the message center operator. In 
this message, ·the operator would attempt to des-
cribe the needed action, and give the message to 
the message center supervisor for numbering and 
distribution. 
~~....-r:••w ..... ,....,~.. ;w:a:A«~Will --"''-7'""''-~~,%~ 
PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION/DATE 
The discrepancy between actual Message Center 
procedures and our written procedures will be 
rectified during our next plan update in 1937. 
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luation Activities Undertaken by the 
and Regional Assistance Committee, 
ty Draft Emergency Response Plan was 
before the guidance was published and 
application of the newly developed 
Plan was adopted by the County on 
ew or approval of the Federal Emergency 
si Committee, Region IX). 
ical Emergency Response Plan was offi-
on October 18, 1983. It has not been 
Emergency Management Agency/Regional 
Response Plan has not been 
t submitted for review by the 
Agency/Regional Assistance Committee, 
o1ogica1 emergency response plans 
assigned to the exercises noted below.] 
was conducted on September 16, 1981. 
Management Agency/Regional Assistance 
fullscale exercises conducted 
1 . A limited exercise conducted 
luated by the Federal Emergency Manage-
ttee, Region IX. Evaluator findings 
to by the offsite jurisdictions 
or disallowed by the offsite jurisdic-
siren demonstration and public telephone 
2, 1985. The system was approved by 
Agency on August 29, 1986. 
was provided to the Sacramento 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.te jurisdictions on March 26, 1986. 
been disseminated by the Sacramento 
ts within the ten-mile emergency plan-
·. 
• 
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General objectives and guidelines have been developed for the 1986 Emergency 
Preparedness Exercise scheduled to be conducted on October 8, 1986. 
Participants \n this exercise include the Sacramento Municipal Ut\lity 
District <SMUD>. the counties of Amador, Sacramento and San Joaquin and the 
California Office of Emergency Services <OES>. 
The "extent of play" by exercise participants is listed below each objective. 
If nothing \s listed below the objective, all players should respond according 
to the Emergency Plan. 
A. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES - ONSITE 
1. Control Room 
a. Demonstrate the proficiency of Control Room staff to recognize and 
classify an emergency condition. 
~ A second shift of Operations staff will participate throughout 
the exercise and will interface with Technical Support Center 
<TSC> staff <AP 501, Recognition and Classification of 
Emergencies>. The second shift staff will be pre-positioned. 
'' 
".b. Demonstrate timely notification to federal, state and local 
authorities in a timely manner. 
- Perform notification, AP 506, Notification/Communication. 
c. Demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities from the Control Room 
staff to the TSC staff. 
- Transfer of responsibilities to the TSC will occur at the ALERT 
Level. Operations staff will continue to participate. 








analyze current plant conditions and 
potenti 1 consequences. 
t!mely and appropriate 
lve Action Guide. 
2. Technical Support Center <TSC), and Plant Assembly Point <PAP> 
a. to activate and operate the TSC and PAP. 
ion and Operation of the TSC and 
ion of PAPs. 
establish and maintain emergency 
gather, assess, and dtssemfnate 
conditions and the emergency response 
the TSC and PAP staffs, 1n conjunction 
• to coordinate activ1ties to simulate 
stable condition. 
yze current plant conditions and 
potent1al consequences. 
TSC and PAP staffs to direct and 
radiological monitoring teams. Teams 
ite surveys and provide this 
Logi 1cs Coordinator. 
1o1ogfca1 Monitoring, and AP 508, 
ing. Some simulation of actions 
repeated air sampling. 
rform offsite dose a~sessment 








h. Demonstrate the abiltty to perform timely assessment of 
radiological and plant conditions to support the formula.tion of 
appropriate prot~ct1ve action recommendation~. 
- Perform AP 528, Protective Action Guide. 
1. Demonstrate the ability to control the exposure of emergency 
workers. 
- Perform AP 515, Emergency Personnel Dosimetry. 
j. Demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities from the TSC staff to 
the EOF staff. 
k. Demonstrate the ability to keep emergency logs. 
1. Demonstrate the ability to inform plant staff of emergency events 
and safety information. 
3. Security 
a. Demonstrate the ability to control access to the site and 
emergency centers. 
- Security will control access to the Control Room, TSC, and 
PAP. Initial security measures will be performed with play 
reduced later in the exercise. 
B. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES - OFFSITE · ... 
1. Emergency Operations Facility <EOF>: 
a. Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the EOF. 
- Perform AP 506.02, Activation and Operation of the EOF and 
AP 554, Activation and Operation of UDAC . 
b. Demonstrate the coordination between SMUD, the counties, and the 
state in decisionmaking. 
c. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain appropriate 
communications links. 
30 
.. facilities and di plays to support 
recommendations tn accordance with 
emergency activitles. 
the EOF for making recommendations to 
onmaktng. 
on to County decisfonmakers for 
il ty of County Liaisons to relay county 
staff. 
EOF telecopier system between all offsite 
the ability of telecopier/ 
dtsseminate all transmissions in a timely 
to prepare press releases and coordinate 
between the counties, state and SMUD 
on equipment. 
lease of Information to the Public. 
discussion between decisionmakers to determine 
controlled recovery and reentry. 
coordinate radiological and 
obtain data from the TSC and Radiation 
data to perform dose projections. 
Dose Calculation. 




provide input to EOF briefings <using 
) including field data, meteorological 
ions for protective actions. 
efing Forms as stated in AP 506.02 and AP 
31 
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e. Demonstrate the ability to distribute EOF Briefing Forms to 
personnel at the EOF and County Emergency Operations Centers CEOC> 
prior tc briefings. ·, -
3. Emergency N'·'!.~ .... center <ENC> 
a. Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the ENC. 
- Perform AP 556, Activation and Operation of the ENC. ENC staff 
will be pre-positioned. 
b. Demonstra.te the ability to establish and maintain appropriate 
communication links. 
- Receive press releases via telecopy and post all releases. 
c. Demonstrate the ability to schedule and conduct news conferences 
to include answering technical questions. 
d. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in· 
a coordinated fashion. 
e. Demonstrate coordinated news conferences including all 
participating agencies. 
4. Security 
a. Demonstrate the ability to control access to the EOF and ENC. 
- Use badging system to maintain appropriate accountability . 
5. Amador, Sacramento-and San Joaquin Counties 
a. Demonstrate ability to receive notification at their EOCs from 
Control Room/TSC, using appropriate forms . 
b. Demonstrate the ability to activate and operate the Eocs· and Field 
Command Posts <FCPs>. 
- Staff will be pre-positioned. 
c. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, displays and equipment to 
support emergency operations. 
d. Demonstrate the ability to adequately communicate with appropriate 
locations and organizations. 
e. Demonstrate the ability of public officials to determine . 
appropriate protective actions for the Public Protection Areas. 
f. Demonstrate the ability of public officials to coordinate 
protective actions and emergency activities. 
f 
\ 




:s completed, demonstrate the ability 
na~e the implementation of protective 
of sirens, the activation of 
s and the activation of the Emergency 
sultlng 1n a test of the system itself. 
the counties to activate and utilize 
fc1pate at their EOC, FCP and the EOF. 
11 icipate at the EOF and limited play 
of the counties to provide prompt 
information to the media with each 
set up and staff the FCP, including 
sonnel. mainta1ning security and badging 
status boards and use of maps. plus 
nt<s> and issue COV 700s to all traffic 
trate their proper use. 
two <2> Radiological Monitoring teams 
routes. 
the following: 
s and interviews. 
lie information and press releases 
y of county-specific actions. 
provide security at the EOC and FCP. 
OES Director or Coordinator to 
ice chiefs, and for the FCP Commander to 
and activate the EOC and FCPs. 
nto County will be simulated. 
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... b. Demonstrate the capabtltty to provide prompt warning to the·,publ\c 
and special facilities- notification to the EBS stations, 
sounding of sirens, and prompt delivery of messages. 
c. Demons~rcJ.te the abll1ty of Sacramento County to provide prompt 
coordino.tion of emergency informat1on to the med1a 1n ace 1ance 
w1th plans. 
d .. Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate 
emergency activities. 
e. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to 
establish appropriate access control points. Road blocks to be 
placed on side of road at one location. 
f .. Demonstrate the ability of County plume monitoring personnel to 
respond in accordance with plans. 
g. Demonstrate the ability to control the radiological exposure of 
emergency workers. 
h. Demonstrate the ability 1to establish and operate rumor control in 
a coordinated fashion. 
8. San Joaquin County 
a. Demonstrate the capability to provide prompt warning to the 
general public using the EBS system and sirens. 
Simulated broadcast of EBS messages to coincide with EBS 
station t~S'f:~sJ gna 1 .· 
··>"·"·.· ;" -~.·. > ,:·:~~,~~i;~:~?~··: " 
.... - The s 1 reris will· btf sounded. 
b. Demonstrate the ability to provide prompt coordination of 
emergency information to the media according to plan pr~cedures. 
-. Simulated press releases. 
- Actual press will be given special tours, outside of the 
scenario, to allow them and the public to view County 
operations. 
c. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control tn 
a coordinated fashion. 
d. Demonstrate the ability of County plume monitoring personnel to 
respond in accordance with plans. 
- Two monitoring teams and support personnel wi 11 be mobi 1 ized. 










organizational ability and resources necessary to 
iate access control points. 
i11 be established. 
lity to perform personnel monitoring at the 
ability to staff the EOF with the EOF Liaison, 
1o1ogica1 Health Branch personnel and Public 
ce <PIO> staff and for them to perform their 
will be pre-positioned. 
ability to staff and activate the State Operations 
limited staff. 
1nclude ,the Emergency Director, Chief of Staff, 
rectot, PIO and State Dose Assessment Center 
lity to answer inquiries from the Governor•s 
ab11\ty of SOC staff to receive, understand, and 
data and advise personnel of significance. 
11ty of SOC staff to tdent1fy and seek 
to erroneous data, rumors, and unexpected 
· agencies. 
lity to mobilize and activate the SDAC. 
iltty of the SDAC staff to receive and interpret 
iltty of the State PIO to establish and maintain 
county PIOs. 
11ity of PIOs to understand technical data and 
press releases. 
ility to provide prompt coordination of 
ion the media. 
Exercise Detail portion of this report, the 
the State of California were developed for 














SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 
RANCHO SECO 
1986 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE 
SCENARIO 
A. NARRATIVE SUMMARY 
Initial conditions are that Rancho Seco has been operating at 1001 power 
and has been at this power level for the previous forty <40> days. Core 
age is 300 Effective Fuel Power Days CEFPD> on Cycle 7. One of the 
Reactor Building spray pumps has failed its surveillance test run on swing 
shift the previous day. · The problem was high vibration. Maintenance 
support was called in on midshift. The pump and motor are presently 
disconnected. Repairs are expected by 1600. No other major components 
are out of service and no testing is in progress. Fuel 1s being 
re-arranged in the Spent Fuel Building. 
The first event is that a spent f~el assembly is damaged and a small 
amount of radioactive gases are released. An ALERT should be declared. 
later, the Control Room receives high vibration alarms on the "A" Reactor 
Coolant Pump <RCP>. Minutes later, the 11 A11 RCP suffers impeller and pump 
casing damage. The pump trips and causes a reactor trip. Pump debris is 
carried into the core where structural damage to many fuel rods occurs. 
Gas gap fission products are released into the reactor·coolant. letdown 
radiattoo.monttors are both tn high alarm indicating fuel damage. Many 
rods fafl to fully tnsert"op.Jhe trip due to the damaged fuel assemblies. 
The reactor 1s shutdown but:,:1t is questionable as to the shutdown margin 
;"'f the core. 'f 
One hour later, there is a double-ended shear of the reactor coolant cold 
leg piping at the·dtscharge of the 11 A11 RCP. The top of the core is 
uncovered for a few seconds but no cladding damage occurs from overheating 
because the reactor is shutdown. There ts no hydrogen generation. Some 
fuel cladding damage does occur as a result of the rapid depressurization 
of the Reactor Coolant System <RCS) and fission products are released into 
the coolant and out the break into the Reactor Building. The Safety 
Features System initiates. All emergency cooling pumps start and provide 
sufficient core cooling. A combination of failures disables all emergency 
systems designed for Reactor Building cooling. 
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared. 
A few hours later, the Auxiliary Building stack monitors alarm due to a 
breach of containment. Reactor Building pressure is still high so the 
potential exists for the release of large amounts of radioactivity to the 
atmosphere. 
A GENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared. 
ease of radioactivity continues until the Reactor Building pressure 
atmospheric pressure due to the flow out the 
and to cooling from the normal coolers 7 At this point, 
probL:ms, the RCS becomes saturated for·a short 
y from the Spent Fuel Pool is aligned. Low 
on emergency sump rectrculation is eventually established 





Federal Emergency Managernent Agency 
\\'ashington, D.C. 20472 
Ju 1 y 15 , 1985 
Purpose 
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM EX-1 
REMEDIAL EXERCISES 
This Guidance Memorandum provides criteria and procedures for requiring and 
scheduling remedial exercises and other remedial actions to correct deficiencies 
identified in exercises to test State and local radiological emergency response 
plans. It also provides guidance for determining the extent of participation in 
remedial exercises. 
Background 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA} rule, 44 CFR 350, and the 
Nuclear Regul.atory Commission {NRC) rule, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, require 
that State and local governments participate in periodic, joint exercises 
with utilities. These rules require remedial exercises and other corrective 
measures if the results of these exercises do not give reasonable assurance 
that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological 
emergency or the deficiencies identified are significant enough to impact 
on the public health and safety. The NRC rule (10 CFR 50, Appendix E, 
IV.f.4.) calls for NRC-FEMA consultation in making a determination as to 
·whether a remedial exercise is needed. The FEMA rule (44 CFR 350.9.c.5) 
leaves the determination of the participation required from State and local 
governments to the appropriate FEMA Regional Director. 
For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA uses an evaluation method to apply 
the criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.* FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies 
as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actions. Deficiencies are 
demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite 
emergency preparedness· was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that 
appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety 
of the public living in the. vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event 
of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies 
on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through 
appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or other 
actions. Areas reauiring correct~ve act~ons are demonstrated and observed 
1nadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their 
correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are 
not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety. 
In addition to these inadequacies, FEMA identifies areas recommended for 
* The metnod currently 1n use is incorporated in the August 5, 1983, memoranaum 
from the FEMA Deputy Associate Director of State and Local Programs and 
Support to the FEMA Regional Directors, subject: "Procedural Policy on 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Plan Reviews, Exercise Observations and 








1 ''rn areas observed during an exercise that are 
e 1 y i r:1 pact pub 1 i c he ,:J 1 t h and safe t y • Wh i 1 e not 
these would enhance·"' :)rCJanint:::,,' ~level of 
a s 11 used in determining the need for requiring a 
one or more of the following planning standards of 
EP-1 will require a remedial exercise. Exceptions 
rement may be made when correction of deficiencies can 
strated other remedial actions. 
ponsibility (Organization Control) (A); 
i cation Methods and Procedures (E); 
i cations ,(F) ; 
ion and Information (areas related to emergency 
on) (G); 
sessment (including field monitoring and radiological 
(I); 
s se (including evacuation and other protection 
decisionmaking) (J); 
ure Control (K); and 
c Health Support and Services (L). 
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ion be required when areas requiring corrective 
raise doubts as to whether adequate protective 
in the event of an emergency. 
Procedures for Reporting on the Need for and Scheduling of Remedial Actions 
1. 
2 
nt exercise indicates that there is the potential 
ion, the following procedures will be followed. 
ce will immediately notify FEMA Headquarters, by 
at re of exercise inadequacies~ FEMA Headquarters 
and discuss these inadequacies with NRC Headquarters. 
fice will promptly initiate a consultation process 
the Regional Assistance Committee(s) (RAC), the 
arters for these purposes: (a) To classify 
uac es, (b) to specify appropriate remedial actions, 
exercises, drills, or other actions, for both 
reas r iring corrective actions and (c) to determine 
are to involved in remedial actions. During 






3. Within 30 days of the exercise, the FEMA Region will transDit a letter 
and draft report consisting of, at least, a summary table of the 
exercise inrHiequacies to thr <;tate(s) with a copy .to FEHA Ht:adquarter·s 
and the RAC( s). The letter .Iii•! summary tJh 1 r· wi 1 1' confirm the results 
of the consultations with ti1c SLdte(s). The State will be asked to 
use this letter and summary table ·of exercise inadequacies as a basis 
·--···for working with the FEMA Region in accomplishing the remedial actions. . . 
4. Within 60 days from the exercise, the FEMA Region will prepare and 
transmit copies of the exercise report to the State{s), RAC(s) and FEMA 
Headquarters. If the remedial exercise or other remedial actions 
have been taken and evaluated prior to the end of the 60 day period, the 
FEMA Region will incorporate its evaluation of these actions within the 
exercise report. (In this case, the report will be completed and forwarded 
within 30 days of the remedial exercise or other remedial actions.) · 
5. FEMA Headquarters will forward a copy of the exercise report to NRC 
Headquarters within 10 days of receipt from the FEMA Regional Office. 
6. If the remedial exercise or other remedial actions are not conducted 
prior to the preparation and forwarding of the exercise report, they 
should be completed as soon ~s possible but not later than 60 days after 
the report is forwarded to FEMA Headquarters. 
7. If the evaluation of the remedial exercise or other remedial actions 
are not incorporated into the exercise report, the FEMA Regional Office 
will prepare and forward an evaluation report of these remedial actions 
to the State(s), RAC(s) and FEMA Headquarters within 30 days of the 
conduct of their completion. 
.i 
·~ y 
8. FEMA Headquarters will forward a copy of the remedial action evaluat~on 
report to NRC Headquarters within 10 days of receipt from the FEMA Regional J 
·Office. 
Extent of Participation 
The extent of State and· local government participation in a remedial exercise 
shall be determ~ned by the FEMA Regional Director. Some factors to consider in 
this determination incl~de: 
1. 
.. 1 . I 
The remedial exercise should address only those activities that are necessary · 
to demonstrate correction of the identified deficiencies. .~ 
2. To the extent possible, the remedial exercise participation should be 
limited to organizations having the deficiency(ies). 
3. When the corrective action by one organization cannot be demonstrated 
without involvement of other organizations, their participation should 
be at a level necessary to confirm the corrective action. This includes 
participation by utilities which should be arranged through the 






d Remed; t~l Exercises 
~.!.Jl exercise indicates that an _organization did not 
orrection of identif1ed deficiencies, one· of the 
are taken. 
s not approved offsite planning and preparedness for the 
site r 44 CFR 350, FEMA may, in consultation with NRC, 
ot r remedial exercise and the NRC may consider enforcement 
offsite planning and preparedness for the involved 
350, FEMA may initiate steps to withdraw the 350 
e another remedial exercise under the provision of 
NRC may consider enforcement actions. 
um has been prepared in coordination with the NRC staff. 




· OFFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT 
RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION' 
EMEHC; : '( PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE 
OCTOBER 8, 1986 
EVALUATOR ROSTER 
FACILITY 
Emergency Operations Facility 
PIO Coordination 
County Liaison Activity 
Amador Emergency Operations Center· 
Field Command Post 
Sacramento. Emergency Operations Center 
Field Command Post 
EVALUATOR 
Kent Prendergast, RAC/NRC (Subs.) 
Nicholas B. Nikas, FEMA/RIX 
Joseph D. Dominguez, FEMA/RIX 
Anna Hart, RAC/USDA 
Suzanne Mooney, FEMA/RIX 
Ken Lerner, ARGONNE 
Paul Lynch, RAC/DOI (Subs.} 
John Robinson, FEMA/RIX 
Ken Bertram, ARGONNE 
i$i~';{·.:,,,:,;.-:i~l~~~n Joaquin Emergency Operations Center 
;:,~.~ ·~ ~,Y; , :) .:· ·: ~;~f:.!~!\' . 
Lyle Slagle, INEL 
Susan Elkins, FEMA/RIX 
Joe Keller, INEL 
• 
'· 
_.... Field Command Post 
····~;Emergency News Center 
Unified Dose Assessment Center 
'· . Radiological Field Monitoring Teams 
i.~ .' .... ~~I -
Amador County (2 teams) 
Sacramento County (2 teams) 




Don Fingleton, ARGONNE 
Verne Paule, FEMA/RIX 
David L. Duncan, RAC/EPA 
Walt Strach, RAC/NWS 
Manley Wu, FEMA/RIX 
Chuck Taylor, RAC/DOE 
Nate Chipman, INEL 
Ken Miles, RAC/FDA 
Brad Salmonson, INEL 
Dale Stevenson, RAC/FDA 
Jim Opelka, ARGONNE 
Hal Aldrich, FEMA/RIX 
Stan Harter, CA-OES 
Bob Krueger, CA-OES 
Ed Henry, RAC/DOT 
Pete Sill, FRPCC 




ITE EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT 
SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION. 
PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE 
ER 8, 1986 
SEQUENCE O.F EVENTS 
43 
on of the scenario was based on the utility and 
ju sdictions to begin at approximately 8:00 a.m. 
in a prepositioned status. The utility amended 
exercise to effect their operations beginning at 
la at 5:40a.m. The state and local offsite 
8: a.m. beginning point, prepositioned. These 
inated and approved by the Federal Emergency Manage-
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
E V E N T 
Site Area General Termination 
9:00 a.m. 10:30 a.m. 2:30 p.m. 
-------~-------------~--~------------------------------------------------------
9:10a.m. 10:39 a.m. 2:21 p.m. 
9:26 a.m.* 10:40 a.m.* 2:14 p.m.* 
9:10a.m. 10:38 a.m. 2:21 p.m. 
9:13 a.m. 10:43 a.m. 2:30 p.m. 
at the utility emergency operations 
operations center notification can appear 
on the situation at that time. 
mes shown for termination of the exercise occurs 
ons centers monitoring of emergency operations 
nating in advance of the actual notification from 





1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize 
staff and activate facilities 
promptly. 
2. Demonstrate ability to fully 
staff facilities and maintain 
staffing around the clock. 
3. Demonstrate ability to make 
decisions and to coordinate 
emergency activities. 
4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities 
and displays to support emergency 
operations. 
5. Demonstrate ability to coomunicate 
with all appropriate locations, 
organizations, and field personnel • 
,.. 
6. Deconstrate ability to mobilize 
and deploy fie~d monitoring 
teams in a timely fashion. 
7. Demonstrate appropriate equipment 
and procedures for deter:ining 
ambient radiation levels. 
. , 
8. Demonstrate appropriate equipnent 
and procedures for measurement of 
airborne radioiodine concentrations 
as low as 10-1 uCi/CC in the 
presence of noble gases. 
9. Demonstrate appropriate equipcent 
and procedures for collection, 
transport and analysis of samples 
of soil, vegetation, snow, water, 
and ill.ilk. 
CORRESPONDING . 
PART(S) OF FORM 
EOC Sec. I 
EOF Sec. I 
MEDIA Sec. I 
RELOC Sec. I 
!!:!_ Sec. I 
EOC Sec. I 
EOF Sec. I 
M.EDL\ Sec. I 
RELCC Sec. I 
EOC Sec. II 
ECC Sec. III 
Eo'f Sec. II 
MEDL-\. Sec. II 
EOC Sec. IV 
EOF Sec. III 
'M'EDL-\ Sec. III 
RELOC Sec. III 
FA Sec. I, II 
FM Sec. IV 
FM Sec. I 
FM Sec. II, III 
FM Sec. II, III 
RADL~ Sec. I, II 
!!:!_ Sec. II, III 





































PART(S) OF F'),':: 
ECC Sec. V 
EOF Sec. XI 
EOC Sec. V 
E'CiF Sec. VI 
EOC Sec. VII.C 
EOC Sec. VI 
u-see. III 
EOC Sec. VI 
EOC Sec. VII.A 
~Sec. I 
EOC Sec. VILA 
~Sec. I 
EOC Sec. VILA 
FA Sec. I 
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Demonstrate the organizational 
ability and resources necessary 
to effect an orderly evacuation 
of mobility-impaired individuals 
within the plume EPZ .. · 
Demonstrate the o~ganizational 
ability anc resources necessary 
to effect an orderly evacuation 
of schools within the plume EPZ • 
. 
Demonstrate ability to continuously 
monitor and control emergencr 
worker exposure. 
·Demonstrate the abilty to make the 
decision, based on predetermined 
criteria, whether to issue KI to 
. emergency workers and/or the general 
population. 
22. D~monstrate the ability to supply 
and ad:ninister K.I, once the decision 
has be~n made to ido ... so 
' ' ' ,. ,. ' ... . ~:'::. ' 
23. Demonstrate abillt'y 'to effect an 
P• orderly evacuation. of 'onsite 
personnel. 
24 •. Demonstrate ability to brief the 
media in a clear, accurate and 
timely manner. 
25. Demonstrate ~bility to provide 
advance coordination o·f infor.::Lation 
released. 
26. Demonstrate ability to establish 
and operate rumor control in a 
coordinated fashion. 
27. Demonstrate adequacy o~ procedures 
for registration and radiological 
monitoring of evacuees 
28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities 
for mass care of evacuees. 
CORRESPONDING 
PART(S) OF FOrui 
',• 
EOC. Sec. VII.B 
FA Sec. II.B 
EOC Sec. VII.B· 
FA""'sec. ILA 
EOC Sec. VIII 
f:A"'Sec. IV 
FM Sec. V 
EOC Sec. V 
EoF Sec. VI 
EOC Sec. VIII 
FA'sec. rv 
FM Sec. V 
-r-
EOC Sec. VII. B 
EOC Sec. IX 
MEiriA Sec. rv 
EOF Sec. IV -
EOC Sec. LX: 
MEDL-\ Sec. IV 
EOF Sec. II 
'i1EDIA Sec. VI 
RELOC Sec. II 



















PART (S) OF FOR...'i.f 
DECON all 
MEDIC Sec. III 
MEDIC Sec. II 
(to be developed) 
(to be developed) 
EOC Sec. V 
EOF Sec. VI 
EOC Sec. X 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Washington, D.C. 204:72 
GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM PR-1 
POLICY ON NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 
AND 44 CFR 350 PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS 
CCT l985 
Thi~ Guidance Memorandum (GM) provides interpretation and clarification of 
req irements contained in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
ru~~. 44 CFR 350, and NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, re1ated to periodic planning 
a·, exercise a~tivities and other requirements affected by the biennial 
l ~rcise frequency and other REP program emphases. 
8ackQround 
With the publication of the final 'FEMA rule, 44 CFR 350, on September 28, 1983, 
and the the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) final regulation, 10 CFR 50, 
on July 6, 1984, it has become necessary to clarify some of the requirements 
contained in these rules and our common gui-danc.e:... cri t:eria.:..."tioc.l.llllent, NUREG-0654 
/FEMA-REP-1. Also, as we are approaching the:.. fffttT jem-·.a£-""t:tre!: i.mpleentat.io.n 
of our joint (NRC/FEMA) radiological emergeney prepared'rTes~ .. :('R'EY} p~a:X;:--· · 
it is appropriate to highlight and clarify requirements rel ated.:· .. ta.:~dic 
assessments, especially those made in the~fifth and sixth year of a State's 
. . REP program. · 
,._ r ... ~"'' . 
Guidance 
The changes and program emphases related to the referenced planning standards 
and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR 350 are addressed 
to State and local ·governments and to Federal reviewers of plans and prepared-
ness. This guidance is divided into three ·s'ections. Section A contains 
planning standards, evaluation criteria and other REP program requirements 
that have been revised and/or clarified to facilitate compliance. Section B 
include_s those which remain unchanged but are highlighted here to ensure 
comple·tion and compliance. Section C describes the Annual Letter of 
·Certification which is submitted by the State to the FEMA Regional Director 
documenting actions taken on the requirements presented in sections A and B. 
SECTION A: THE FOLLOWING EVALIIATIO~ CRITERIA INCLUDE CHANGES FROM EXISTING 
REQUIREMENTS 
PLANNING ST~NDARD.S AND EVALUATION CRITERION 
N. Exercises and Drills 
Planninq Standard 
Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of 
emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to 
develop and maintain key skills. and deficiencies identified as a result of 
exercises and drills are {will be) corrected. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, p.71}. 
of State and lor.a1.personne1 and 
il ity to respond to an accident 
49 
r1i ation shall provide for· a crit' ;::,· 
eral and State observers/eva1uatoro. 
om exercise to exercise year ta year such 
ans and preparedness organizations are 
od. Each o anization should make 
e:OO 
resses several periodic exercise requirements~ 
fied. The most important change is to permit 
preparedness elements within a six rather 
remaining exercise requirements are placed 
exercise r~rements, State---ami:·1oc.a1 
requirements: 
a ted to ·ttie- six-year compliance ~rioct far--
delineated in N.l.b. above. the six-year 
of first joint (utility and State 
conducted after November 3, 1980, the 
atory Commission Finai Regulations 
rt 50 (Appendix E) (45 55410. 
e, if the date of the first joint exercise 
the six-year period is March 23, 1987. 
s are to be tested within the six-year period 
ingestion-related elements as the 
not tied to a particular site for State 
Criteria 3 below.) 
rcises should be sufficiently varied so 
ements of the plans and preparedness of offsite 
thin a six-year period. The major elements 
are incorporated in the 35 exercise objectives 
983, memorandum: "Procedural Policy on 
paredness Plan Reviews. Exercise Observations 
e im Findings." 
requirement for eacn 
~~::..:...;:;.::;._.....J;...;___:_~:::_:_:;:.:.:..:.__;,;_:...:.:.:..:...:..:__:_::..::......::::..:::..:...:::.::.:....:.. t 0 f u 11 y 
a in NUREG-0554/FEMA-REP-1, the new language is 






exercise its pldn·; and prcp<~redness related to ingestion exposu:··:' 
pathway measures nt least once every six years in conjunction with a 
plume exposure pathway exercise for some site feF tAat si\ea This 
requirement is reflected in the 35 exercise objectives and is 
presented in 44 CFR 350.9(c)(4). Each State with ingestion exposure 
pathway responsibilities for two or more sites located within its 
borders will fully participate at some site on a rotationa1 basis and 
partially participate at the other sites once every six years. A 
State which has ingestion related responsibilities for a site(s) 
located within its borders and which is also within the 50-mile 
ingestion exposure pathway of a site(s) located in a bordering 
State(s), shall partially participate in all of the ingestion 
related e~ercises for those bordering State site{s). For those 
States that do not have a power plant located in its borders, but 
are located within the 50-mile Emergency Planning Zone of a hordering· 
State's power plant, they should fully participate in at least one 
exercise over a six-year period and partially participate in all 
others. These ingestion-related requirements represent revision 
of provisions contained in both ~UREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR 
350.9(c)(4}. 
The definition of full participation in ingas.tton·.·aspects of exercises 
is guided by 44 CFR 350.2(j). Since 1ocal.qovernmem:s are·not usually 
required to develop and test ingesticrn plans anct·prepaid~~. State 
officials would be the emergency personrrel primarily involved tn the 
ingestion portion of exercises. Howe>ter,. in some-States, local 
governments hav,e. responsibilities that require:.t:treir· participation in 
,it·!'!'.f ~p~ :·· '··:-i'. ~ ' . • 
such.e~ercisE!~,i,~J~~~'\h.~~rymber and funct1?n of ~ersonnel nee1ed should be 
suff1c1ent for carry1ng out all those 1ngest1on measures that are 
necessitated by a particular accident scenario. Also, organizations 
fully participating in the ingestion portion of an exercise should 
deploy field teams to secure and analyze media samples as required by 
the accident scenario. 
5. The definition of partial participation in ingestion aspects of exercises 
is guided by 44 CFR 350.2(k). As stated in item 4 above. State officials·.: 
.. would be the emergency personnel primarily involved in the ingestion 
portion of exercises. The number and function of State personnel needed 
should be determined on the basis of verifying capabilities for carrying 
out the following responsibilities: Direction and control and related 
communications for protective action decisionmaking and dissemination 
of emergency information to appropriate individuals, groups and the 
general public. Organizations partially participating in the 
ingestion portion of an exercise will not have to deploy field teams 
to secure and analyze media samples as such sections can be simulated. 
6. Offsite organizations should make provision to start an exercise 
between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. once every six years • 
. . 
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·' 7. anizations should schedule• exercises at different seasor:s 
riod to increas tr•e likelihoorl for exercising under 
conditions. This i,~.Jvision can be fu1fi1led through the 
i of exercises ar,.: ''1 cDnjunction with it.ems 2 and 3 
8. anizations should make prov1s1on to participate in 
exercises at least once every six years. An unarinounvi 
exercise is a ar1y scheduled exercise in which the ·knowledge 
· t teo the exercise is restricted to only those person· 
to know. Although the knowledge of the exact date is 
a time frame of 7 days within which the unannounced 
to conducted will be established and known to a11 
9. 8 may be combined in the same exercise or addressed. 
ses thin a six-year period. 
SECT OTHER PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS HIGHLIGHTED TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE 
NEED FOR COMPLIANCE * 
f. 
G. 
STANDARDS AND EVALUATION CRITERIA .. ~ ... 
,·: . . "":"' .•. ..: .· ... ·. "' ..... 
-·· . I 
Planninq Standa~d · .. 
communication'!>·C.:ff!ong principal response organizations 
the public.·· (NUREG-0554/FEMA-REP-1, p.47) 
11 conduct periodic testing of the entire emergency 
ev uation criteria N.2.a., N.2.d. and Appendix 3.) 
Planning Standard 
e to the public on a periodic basis on how they 
their initial actions should be in an emergency 
c broadcast station and remaining indoors), the 
contact th the news media for dissemination of information 
nc1uding the physical location or locations) are established 
es r coordinated dissemination of information to the 
(NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, p.49) 
.. 
zation shall provide a coordinited periodic {at least annu~lly} 
in rmation to the public regarding how they will be notifi~ 
ac ions should be in an emergency. This information shall 
ari1y be limited to: 
rmation on radiation; 
t ona1 in nnation; 
,. 
®:;~:; ,:i,;,:·~_,:'.« 
'!:' ~ : ! '; 
• 
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' l • 
. '' 1ltect ive me.Jsur·es, e.g., eva, 11 ·: 1 'fl routes ~nd rel'ocat1on centt~rs, 
_;heltering, respiratory protect1u::, radioprotective drugs; and-
d. special needs of the handicapped. 
Means for accomplishing this dissemination may include, but not necessarily 
.limited to:. information in the telephone book, periodic information in utility 
bills and publications distributed on an annual basis. 
G.2 •. The public information program shall provide the permanent and transient 
adult population within the plume exposure EPZ an adequate opportunity to . 
become aware of the information annually. The programs should include provision. 
for written material that is likely to be available in a residence during an 
emergency. Updated information shall be disseminated at least annually. 
Signs or other measures (e.g., decals, posted notices or other means, placed 
in hotels, motels, gasoline stations and phone booths} shall also be used to 
disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ 
appropriate information that would be helpful if an emergency or accident 
occurs. Such notices should refe~ the transient to the telephone directory 
or other sources of local emergency information and guide the visitor to 
appropriate radio and televison frequencies. 
G.5. Each organization shall conduct coordinated·ptcg:zams:.·at.least annually 
toacqua i nt news media with emergency plans, i nfornr~ttorr concerning r.ad i at ion 
and points of contact for release of publ it: ·i:ryfarrirttion. 
n. Emergency Facilities and Equipment 
Planninq Standard 
Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response 
are provided and maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEHA-REP-1, p.52) 
Evaluation Criterion 
H.lO. Each organization shall make provisions to inspect, inventory and 
operationally check emergency equipment/instruments at least once each calendar 
quarter and after each use. There shall be sufficient reserves of 
instruments/equipment to replace those which are removed from emergency kits 
for calibration or repair. Calibration of equipment shall be at intervals 
·recommended by the supplier of the equipment. 
N. Exercise and Drills 
Planninq Standard 
Periodic exercises are (will be}· conducted to evaluate major portions of 
emergency response capabilites, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to 
develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of 





Drill Requirements (Evaluatio:1 riteria) 
N.2 .. Definition: A drill is a supervised instruction period aimed at . 
testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation. 
A drill is a component of an exercise. A drill shall be supervised 
and evaluated by a qualified drill instructor. Each organization s-hall 
conduct drill~, in addition to the biennial annual exercise a the 
frequencies indicated below: 
N.2.a. Communication Drills: Three types of communication drills are 
addressed: (a) Communications with State and local governments within the 
plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone shall be tested monthly; 
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(b) communications with Federal emergency response organizations and State(s) 
within the ingestion pathway shall be tested at least once quarterly in 
conjunction with the testing of plume exposure pathway measures of the 
State plan and (c) communications between the nuclear facility, State and 
local government emergency operations centers and field assessment teams 
shall test at least once every year. Communication drills shall also 
include the as understanding the content of messages. 
N.2.c. Medical Emergency Drills: A medical emergency_d:rtl.l involving a 
simulated contaminated indiviaual that contairrs provisfons:Aor participation 
by local su rt service agencies (i.e., ambulance and offsite.medical 
treatment fac 1ity) sha11 be conducted annually. 
N.2.d. Radiological Monitoring Drills: Requirements are set forth for two 
types of radiological ,monitoring drills: (a) Radiological monitoring drills 
rtlated to plume pbsure pathway emergency planning zone shall be 
condu ed at least annually and shall include provisions for communications 
and record ng. (b) Radiological monitoring drills related to the 
ingestion exposure.pathway emergency planning zone shall be conducted at 
leas annually and. shall include provisions for communications and record 
keep ng. · · · 
N.2.e. Health Physics Drills: Health Physics drills shall be conducted 
sem -a:.nnually by State governments with 1 icensees to test response to and 
anal s of simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct 
. rad ion measurements in the environment. The State dri 11 s can be conducted 
site. 




emergency response ·training is provided to those who may be 
assist in an emergency. (NUREG-0654/FE~A-REP-1. p.75) 
• t 
Evaluation Criteria 










~~on <~lion shall partic::pate in and reuivP 
~ i rl ~ r e e;n P n t •. · • \i ., t between 1 o c a 1 age n c i e s s ur I' r i r r , 
trainln:J sllall also be offered to the,,, ··1 
rs mutual aid district. 
The special zed initial 
defin th res to 
training 
t i r sc 
lish a training program for instructing and 
ement radiological emergency response plans. 
and periodic retraining programs shall be 
and frequency and should be provided in 
the following 
a. or coordinato s of response orgranizations; Directors 
Personn 












j . Per so 
instructi 
o. 5. Each 
Citpersonn 
responsible accident assessment; 
manito i teams and radiological analysis personnel; 
and f re ghting personnel; 
rescue personnel; 
services rsonnel including Civil Defense/Emergency 
;I and 
fo transmission of emergency information and 
11 provide for the initial anrl.annual retraining 
res nse responsibilities. 
P. Respo,sibi1ity for the Planninq Effort::.·Development. Periodic Review 





plans are estab1is 
dev o and review and for distribution of emergency: 
, and planners are properly train~d. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l;i 
. p.78) . 
Evaluation Crite a 
P.4. ch o aniza 
. and certify it to 
"-.I: ., 
1nto account c 
11 ate its plan and agreements as needed, review 
on a annual basis. The update shall tak.e 
drills and exercises. 
P.S. The erne 
beforwarded to 
for implementation 
response plans and approved changes to the plans shall 
to show re 
P.lO. ch o anizat 
TTSts and maps in erne 
anizati s and appropriate individuals with responsibility 
plans Revised pages shall be dated and marked 
e been made. 
a1 provide for updating telephone numbers, call-down 
edures at least quarterly. 
Appendix 3: Means Fo idina Promot Alert and Notification of Response 
Organizations And The Populat1on 
Periodic irements 
delineated in a rthc 
ted to alert and notification will be discussed and 
~ 
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SECTION C: ANNUAL LETTER G= rERTIFICATION 
In o er to facilitate the monitoring of REP planning and pre. 1r;·:iness 
requirements as prescribed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFP l.:J as 
deli 1n this memorandun, an Annual Letter of Certificati ;n shall be 
subm1 from each State to the appropriate FEMA Regional Director. The 
State submission of the Annual Letter of Certification to the FEHA Regional 
Director shou1~ be made by January 31 of each year and should address 
compH.ance with periodic requirements for Hr· preceding year. This letter 
shall include assurances that the requisite activities have been undertaken 
or completed. as appropriate, by the State and local organizations for the· 
following functions: 
1. Public Education and Information (G): Means of dissemination of 
information. dates, participants, sponsoring organizations and description 
of programs conducted to increase public and media radiological 
emergency planning and response awareness. 
I 
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (H): Type of equipment/instrument, 
quantity and dates of checK/test. 
3. rcises (N): Testing of all major elements, conducting exercises under 
various t1me and seasonal conditions, unannounced exercises and testing of 
State (and local, as appropriate) plans for implementi-r~.::t~ti.::i1:t ~hway 
measures. 
:·- ..... 
4.";-~0ri11s (N): 7Jypes~.idat~s held and parttctpating org-arrizatious .. : .... _. 
<·+. ' :" '+' ~:·\~~:;J,:;,:(, ·,·~;·~.:~_.;' > 
5. Radiological-Emerg~Wc/-:Response Training (0): Scope and purpose of training, 
dates held, numoer .of participants, agencies represented and sponsors of trainings 
6. Update of Plans and Letters of Agreement (P): Verification that plans and 
letters of agreeme'nt~'have been reviewea and appropriate changes made. Updates 
of plans should tnclu~e telephone numbers, -call-down lists and maps. 
7. Alert and Notification (Appendix 3): Type of tests conducted in accordance 
with estaolished schedule, dates held, and operability percentage achieved based 
on riodic testing. 
. . 
